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 Imagine two people who went on a trip at the same time. They visited the same 
places, ate the same foods, and engaged in the same activities. If they were asked to tell 
us about the trip, their stories would not be the same. Our subjective experience varies 
because each of us attaches different meanings to objects and situations we encounter. 
Yet, the meanings we attach are not just randomly generated. On the contrary, they are 
shaped and reinforced by our traditions and culture (Bruner, 1990).  
 In this sense, culture can be understood as “variable systems of meanings,” 
which are “learned and largely shared by an identifiable segment of people” (Rohner, 
1984, pp119-120). Because these systems of meanings are not universal but culturally 
bound, people in different cultures sometimes interpret situations in different ways and 
hold divergent views and concepts. For example, the concept of the self is considered to 
be contrastingly different across cultures. In North American cultural contexts, people 
tend to hold an independent view of the self. That is, the self is typically understood as a 
unique, distinct, and independent entity (Geertz, 1975; Markus & Kitayama, 1991b). For 
this reason, people with an independent view of the self mostly describe themselves in 
terms of their unique internal attributes such as personal traits, preferences, or attitudes. 
In East Asian cultural contexts, however, people tend to hold an interdependent view of 
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the self. That is, the self is typically understood through relationships with others 
(Markus & Kitayama, 1991b). People with this view of the self often describe themselves 
in terms of their social roles or group affiliations (Cousins, 1989; Trafimow, Triandis, & 
Goto, 1991; Rhee, Uchida, Park, & Kitayama, 2007; Uleman, Lee, & Roman, 1995).  
 Therefore, social others may be much more cognitively salient and an integrated 
part of their self-concept for East Asians than for Americans. Yet, Americans are not 
living in a social vacuum, and forming relationships with others is very important for 
Americans as well. However, how individuals relate to others is also culturally variable. 
While others are perceived as an integral part of the social contexts to which the self is 
connected and assimilated for East Asians, others serve as important sources that allow 
Americans to express, verify, or assert the unique internal attributes of the self (Markus & 
Kitayama, 1991b). Consistent with this view, Americans are more likely to remember 
situations in which they influenced others, but Japanese are more likely to remember 
situations in which they adjusted themselves to others (Morling, Kiytayama, & Miyamoto, 
2002). Also, cultural differences in the relational concepts between the self and others are 
evident in the sociogram task in which people draw a network of their friends by 
connecting circles for the self and their friends. Sociograms created by Americans almost 
always have a significantly larger circle for the self than those for others, with the self 
situated in the center of the network (very much like an airline hub). This is not the case 
for Japanese; their self circle is similar to their friends in size and more of an integrated 
part of the social network than that of Americans (Duffy, Uchida, & Kitayama, 2004).  
 Also, social others are often used as resources to affirm one’s positive internal 
attributes for Americans. For example, Americans experience a sense of efficacy when 
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they influence others (Morling et al., 2002). Also, they evaluate themselves as being 
better and more uniquely talented than others (e.g., Campbell, 1986; Marks, 1984) and 
attribute their failure to external factors (e.g., Miller & Ross, 1975; Zackerman, 1977). 
Considering the fact that those who demonstrate a more realistic evaluations of the self 
tend to be depressed, such self-serving biases are considered to be conducive to 
Americans’ mental health (Taylor & Brown, 1988). However, such self-serving biases 
are virtually absent among East Asians, who sometimes even show self-criticizing 
tendencies (Heine & Lehman, 1997; Kitayama, Markus, Matsumoto, & Norasakkunkit, 
1997; Markus & Kitayama, 1991a). For example, East Asians are more likely to make 
upward social comparisons, especially in a failure context (White & Lehman, 2005) and 
attribute success to external factors (Kitayama, Takagi, & Matsumoto, 1995). Thus, for 
East Asians social others seem to provide the standards or expectations that people aim 
for, and they strive to meet the standards to become a better member of the group (Heine, 
Lehman, Markus, & Kitayama, 1999). Consistent with this view, Japanese were found to 
experience a sense of relatedness when they adjust themselves to others (Morling et al., 
2002). 
 It is, therefore, apparent that the concepts of the self, others, and the relationship 
between the two carry culturally divergent meanings (Markus & Kitayama, 1991b). In all 
cultures, social others may function to actualize the concept of the self although this 
concept differs significantly across cultures. That is, while Americans strive to enhance 
and affirm their positive, unique, internal attributes, which are core components of their 
independent view of the self, Asians strive to become a part of harmonious relationships, 
which construct their interdependent view of the self. 
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 Based on these analyses, my dissertation addresses the cognitive, behavioral, and 
affective consequences of the culturally divergent concepts of the self, others, and the 
relation between the two in various situations. Moreover, it investigates the presence of 
such cultural meanings not only in people’s minds but also in their cultural environment.  
 Chapter 2 presents a research project that specifically focuses on how the 
presence of others influences the perception of a choice in culturally divergent ways. It is 
well known that people justify their choice especially when the choice is perceived as a 
threat to their self-images (e.g., Steele, 1988). However, because the nature of the 
self-concept varies across-cultures, the conditions in which the choice becomes 
self-threatening may also vary. Thus, the research hypothesizes that in American cultural 
contexts, a choice becomes self-threatening when it is made in private and thus perceived 
as self-expressive. In contrast, in Asian cultural contexts, a choice becomes 
self-threatening when it is publicly exposed and, thus, perceived as socially consequential. 
Chapter 2 present three experiments that tested this hypothesis by using the free-choice 
cognitive dissonance paradigm (Brehm, 1956). In these experiments, American and East 
Asian (i.e., Japanese and Asian American) participants made a choice in either the 
presence or absence of “eyes of others,” and the extent to which they justified their 
choice (i.e., by increasing preference for the chosen item and decreasing preference for 
the rejected item) was compared between the two cultures.  
 Chapter 3 focuses on the function of others as an attribution target and examines 
the emotional consequences of causal attribution in two cultural contexts. Appraisal 
theories of emotion propose that the emotions people experience correspond to their 
appraisal of the situation (e.g., Ellsworth, 1994; Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 1995, Scherer, 
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1988). Past research suggests that appraisals, particularly in the dimension of agency, 
significantly differ across cultures. That is, Americans tend to attribute success to 
themselves but failure to external factors whereas East Asians tend to attribute success to 
external factors but failure to themselves (Miller & Ross, 1975; Zackerman, 1977; 
Kitayama et al., 1995). Combining appraisal theories of emotion with the evidence of 
cultural differences in attributions of success and failure, I hypothesize that in similar 
situations, people in different cultures experience different emotions as a result of 
culturally divergent causal attributions of successes and failures. Chapter 3 presents two 
studies that tested this hypothesis. In these studies, American and Japanese participants 
thought about an experience or imagined themselves to be in a situation where they 
succeeded or failed and reported their attribution and emotion. These attribution and 
emotion are compared between the two cultures. 
 While Chapters 2 and 3 focuses on the specific cognitive and emotional 
consequences that occur as a result of the culturally divergent concepts of the self and 
others, Chapter 4 broadens its focus and questions how such culturally contingent 
meanings are disseminated in cultural environment, transmitted to younger generations, 
and internalized by individuals who maintain and reproduce their culture. The research 
presented in Chapter 4 specifically focuses on children’s stories in American and 
Japanese elementary school textbooks as one of the cultural products that are shared by a 
large segment of the population. The studies cross-culturally compared the themes 
highlighted in the stories, schoolteachers’ preference for the stories of different value 




 As a whole, the present dissertation clarifies the cognitive, behavioral, and 
affective consequences of culturally divergent meanings of the self, others, and the 
relation between the two. Also, it provides strong evidence for the existence of such 
meanings in both the cultural environment and in people’s minds. In a larger scope, the 
present dissertation addresses the importance of understanding people’s minds in their 
cultural contexts and the roles culture plays in fostering people’s psychological 
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Watching Eyes and Self-Justification: Dissonance in Varying Cultural Contexts 
 
 Virtually all social psychologists would agree that the idea of dissonance is 
among the most influential in the field. The original theory proposed by Festinger (1957) 
and its subsequent elaborations by Aronson (1968), Cooper and Fazio (1984), and Steele 
(1988) among others, spawned an unprecedented number of studies in an unusually broad 
spectrum of issues and domains with a variety of surprising findings. For example, 
against a commonsensical effect of reward as reinforcing, the theory suggested that 
reward can compromise intrinsic motivation (Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959). Likewise, 
against a widely shared view of humans as rational, the theory implied that humans in 
fact are rationalizing and self-justifying. 
 During the last decade, the interest in dissonance has been revived with yet 
another surprise. Markus and Kitayama (1991) have suggested that dissonance might be a 
uniquely Western phenomenon because it is anchored on an independent view of self. 
Empirical work that followed has presented a more nuanced, yet equally intriguing story. 
On the one hand, a clear dissonance effect has been demonstrated for Asians. Thus, at a 
very high level of abstraction, dissonance appears to be universal. On the other hand, the 
conditions in which a dissonance effect happens vary greatly across cultures 
(Hoshino-Browne, Zanna, Spencer, Zanna, Kitayama, & Lackenbauer, 2005; Kitayama, 
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Snibbe, Markus, & Suzuki, 2004). In fact, the very factor that is necessary for a 
dissonance effect to happen in one culture has turned out to be precisely the one that must 
be avoided if one is to observe the effect in another. This key factor is the presence of 
public eyes. The purpose of the present work is to follow up this observation and 
elaborate our cultural analysis of cognitive dissonance, which emphasizes significant 
roles played by both 1) culturally sanctioned images of the self as independent or 
interdependent and 2) perceived privacy or perceived public scrutiny of the choice. 
Culture and Self 
 It has been proposed that whereas a view of the self as independent is dominant 
in European American cultural contexts, a contrasting view of the self as interdependent 
is strongly sanctioned in Asian contexts (Kitayama, Duffy, & Uchida, 2007; Kitayama & 
Markus, 1999; Markus & Kitayama, 1991, 2004). These views of the self are assumed to 
provide a general blueprint by which individuals organize their motivations and actions in 
a culturally specific fashion. For example, for European Americans, the self is centrally 
defined by a set of attributes that are internal and bounded. Thus, to maintain positive 
views of the self, European Americans are motivated to identify and confirm positively 
valued internal attributes. In support of this analysis, European Americans tend to 
describe themselves with many more positive attributes than negative ones (Holmberg, 
Markus, Herzog, & Franks, 1995), make self-enhancing or defensive attributions for 
success or failure (Miller & Ross, 1975), and show a strong desire to maintain positive 
personal self-images such as high self-esteem and self-efficacy (Taylor & Brown, 1988). 
For European Americans, therefore, their own evaluation of their personal self is the most 
pivotal element in affirming the self as appropriate, decent, and normative.  
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 In contrast, Asians generally construct the concept of the self in relation to social 
others. Thus, they constantly pay attention to social context in order to maintain 
harmonious relationships with others and to gain acceptance and respect from members 
of the group to which they belong. Accordingly, for Asians, others’ evaluations of the 
self tend to play more important roles in affirming the self as appropriate, decent, and 
normative. Indeed, evidence suggests that Asians do not show any robust tendency to 
view themselves in a positive light. For example, they score significantly lower on the 
Rosenberg Self-esteem Scale (Kitayama, Markus, & Lieberman 1995; Markus, Mullally, 
& Kitayama, 1997), they often make negative (rather than positive) statements about 
themselves (Yeh, 1995), and they sometimes show self-criticizing tendencies (Kitayama, 
Markus, Matsumoto, & Norasakkunkit, 1997). Instead of private self-images, Asians are 
much more concerned with their public self-images -- how others would think about them. 
This tendency is demonstrated by their strong concern for honor and face (e.g., Cohen et 
al., in press; Heine, 2007; Kitayama et al., 2004). 
Personal Dissonance and Interpersonal Dissonance 
 In his original formulation, Festinger (1957) proposed that when individuals 
recognize an inconsistency between two cognitions, they feel negative emotional arousal 
called dissonance and that because the dissonance is aversive, the individuals are 
motivated to reduce the inconsistency. Subsequently, however, a number of theorists 
have suggested that self is an integral part of the dissonance process. For example, 
Aronson (1968) proposed that dissonance arises only when the cognitions at issue are 
self-relevant. Furthermore, Steele and colleagues (Steele, 1988; Steele & Liu, 1983; 
Steele, Spencer, & Lynch, 1993) proposed a self-image maintenance theory of dissonance, 
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which regards dissonance as a threat to a well-maintained image of the self. That is, when 
individuals commit a behavior that raises questions about their moral integrity or 
competence, they feel threatened and, as a consequence, they are motivated to reduce this 
threat by justifying the behavior. 
 Drawing both on the self-image maintenance theory of dissonance and on the 
independence-interdependence theory of cultural self, Kitayama and colleagues (2004) 
have proposed that dissonance can take different forms depending on the nature of the 
self that is threatened and thus must be defended. Given the independent view of self, 
which is dominant among European Americans, internal attributes of the self including 
moral integrity and competence are very salient and seen as self-defining. Although 
social relations are important and, in fact, can significantly influence self-evaluations 
(Leary, Tambor, Terdel, & Downs, 1995), how they view themselves depends primarily 
on their personal appraisal and the resulting esteem of the self. Consequently, individuals 
in Western cultures should experience a threat to the self when their behaviors are seen as 
expressive of their internal attributes. Under these conditions, individuals are most 
motivated to justify the choice and, thus, to organize their actions in accordance with the 
choice (Harmon-Jones, 2004). This proposal is consistent with numerous demonstrations 
that a behavior must be perceived as voluntary, freely chosen (Cooper, 1971; Linder, 
Cooper, & Jones, 1967), and thus diagnostic of one’s own internal characteristics in order 
for it to produce a threat to the actor’s independent self. This form of dissonance is called 
personal dissonance (Kitayama et al., 2004). 
 In contrast, given the interdependent view of self, which is dominant among 
Asians and Asian Americans, relational attributes of the self including appraisals and 
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approvals of the self by others in relations are much more salient and self-defining. 
Internal attributes of the self such as moral integrity and competence are certainly 
important. However, how they view themselves rests primarily on public appraisals such 
as respect and honor, which significant others confer on the self. Accordingly, individuals 
in Asian cultures would experience a threat to the self when their behaviors are perceived 
as publicly exposed and scrutinized and, thus, relevant to their reputations and public 
self-images. It is under these conditions that individuals are expected to justify their 
choice and, thus, to organize their goal priorities and other attendant cognitions 
accordingly (Harmon-Jones, 2004). This form of dissonance is called interpersonal 
dissonance (Kitayama et al., 2004).  
 In short, the present analysis suggests that dissonance arousal and reduction are 
likely to depend importantly on cultural context. In independent cultural contexts, one’s 
choice becomes self-threatening when it is made in private and thus experienced as 
self-expressive. Under these conditions, there should be a strong dissonance effect. In 
interdependent cultural contexts, in contrast, one’s choice becomes self-threatening when 
it is made in public and, thus, is experienced as under public scrutiny. It is under these 
conditions that a strong dissonance effect should emerge.  
Empirical Evidence 
 Evidence for the present analysis comes from several studies that use a 
free-choice dissonance paradigm (Brehm, 1956). In this paradigm, participants are 
offered a choice between two equally attractive commodities such as music CDs. 
Changes in the preferences of the pertinent commodities are assessed. A typical 
dependent variable is a spreading of alternatives (SA) – the sum of increased preference 
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for a chosen item and decreased preference for a rejected item. Heine and Lehman (1997) 
conducted the first cross-cultural study with this method and found that while European 
Canadians showed a sizable dissonance effect, this effect was absent among Japanese 
participants. At first glance, it might appear that Japanese experience no dissonance. This 
is not necessarily the case, however. In fact, the present analysis suggests that the failure 
to find a dissonance effect among Japanese may be due to the fact that participants in this 
study were tested in private. Accordingly, they must have perceived no public scrutiny 
over their choice. Under these conditions, public self-images were unlikely to be 
threatened. This implies that Japanese and other Asians would show a reliable dissonance 
effect once they were led to believe that their choice would be known to others in 
relationship.  
 Hoshino-Browne, Zanna, Spencer, Zanna, Kitayama, and Lackenbauer (2005) 
compared a standard free choice condition in which participants made a choice for 
themselves with another condition in which participants made a choice for their friends. 
In the “friend” condition, participants believed that the item chosen for the friends was to 
be delivered to them and, thus, they anticipated that their friends would come to know 
their choice. The researchers replicated the Heine and Lehman (1997) finding in the 
standard condition, in which European Canadians showed a strong dissonance effect, but 
Japanese or Asian Canadians did not. Importantly, however, in the “friend” condition, 
Japanese and Asian Canadians showed a strong dissonance effect, thus providing support 
to the current analysis that people with Asian cultural backgrounds perceive their choice 
as self-threatening when they anticipate the choice to be known to others. In contrast, in 
this same “friend” condition, European Canadians showed little or no dissonance effect. 
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The current analysis would suggest that the European Canadian participants in this 
condition took their friends’ preferences into account in the friend condition. As a result, 
they saw the choice as socially constrained, less self-reflective, and, thus, not as 
threatening to their personal self-images. 
 The link from perceived scrutiny to both the emergence of dissonance among 
Asians and the disappearance of dissonance among European Americans (or Canadians) 
is likely to be well-learned and well-practiced, thus highly automatic and largely 
unconscious. If so, similar cross-cultural differences in dissonance may be found as a 
function of mere exposure to subtle cues indicative of such scrutiny. European Americans 
would immediately perceive their choice as constrained and thus would cease to show a 
dissonance effect when exposed to such cues; but in the same condition Asians would 
immediately perceive their choice as threatening to their public self-images and, thus, 
would begin to show the effect.  
 To investigate this possibility, Kitayama et al. (2004) unobtrusively hung a 
poster ostensively prepared for a conference presentation in front of their participants. On 
the poster several schematic faces were printed so that the faces were placed at eye level. 
From the participants’ perspective, the faces appeared to be “watching them.” In a control 
condition where no poster was presented, a reliable dissonance effect was found among 
European Americans but not among Japanese. In the poster condition, no participants 
raised any suspicions about the poster. Moreover, when questioned, no one expected any 
effects of the poster on their behaviors. Despite the total absence of awareness of public 
scrutiny, participants behaved very differently in the poster condition. As predicted, a 
sizable justification effect was found among Japanese. Interestingly, European Americans 
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showed a somewhat weaker dissonance effect in the face poster condition than in the 
control condition. Kitayama et al. (2004) left this finding unexplained. Nevertheless, in 
light of the current analysis, we could argue that European Americans perceived the faces 
as imposing unwanted influences on them. They might have perceived their choice as 
socially constrained and, thus, not expressive of the personal self.  
The Present Research 
 In the present research, we tried to extend the initial face-poster effect (Kitayama 
et al., 2004) in three important ways. First, we wanted to see if the poster effect depends 
on the timing of the exposure to a face poster. Experiment 1 therefore tested both 
Japanese and American participants while manipulating the timing of the exposure to the 
face poster. Second, we hypothesize that the face poster has its effect because it activates 
face representations. Experiment 2 therefore exposed participants to a cue that sometimes 
activate face representations, and compared European American and Asian American 
participants who “saw” a face and those who did not see a face. Third, the most 
surprising aspect of the accumulating data pertains to the fact that European Americans 
lose dissonance effect when exposed to faces. Thus, Experiment 3 tested a causal 
mechanism for this effect. 
Experiment 1: Public Scrutiny During vs. After Choice 
 One key assumption of the current analysis is that a face-poster (Kitayama et al., 
2004) exerts its influences while participants make their choice. On the one hand, Asian 
Americans would experience their choice as threatening to their ever-important public 
self-images when they make the choice while exposed to cues indicative of public 
scrutiny (i.e., the face poster). On the other hand, in the same condition Americans would 
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experience their choice as socially constrained and, thus, as non-threatening to personal 
self-images, which are defining of their self. This means that the poster should have its 
effect as far as it is available during the choice. If true, exposure to the poster should have 
no effect if it takes place after the choice.  
 To test this idea, we manipulated the timing of the face-poster exposure in 
Experiment 1. In one condition, participants were exposed to the face poster used in 
Kitayama et al. (2004) only during the choice, but in another condition, the exposure to 
the poster took place only after the choice. In a control condition, the poster was absent 
throughout the study. We predicted that the poster effect in the Kitayama et al. (2004) 
study should be replicated only in the face-during-the-choice condition but not in the 
other two conditions. Thus, in this face-during-the-choice condition, Asians were 
predicted to show a greater dissonance effect than Americans would. Furthermore, we 
also predicted that the pattern of data in the face-after-the-choice condition should be no 
different from the one in the control condition. In these two conditions, Americans were 
predicted to show a greater dissonance effect than Asians would. 
 In addition, as suggested by recent findings, African Americans are at least as 
independent as or even more so than European Americans (e.g., Oyserman, Coon, & 
Kemmelmeier, 2002). Therefore, we included African American participants in 
Experiment 1, expecting that the pattern would be very similar between these two ethnic 





 Participants. Thirty-five European American and 21 African American 
undergraduates at the University of Michigan and 65 Japanese undergraduates at Kyoto 
University participated in the study individually in exchange for eight dollars or 500 yen. 
Six participants were eliminated from the data analysis for the following reasons. 
Because the music CDs used in this study were targeted on late teens and early twenties, 
two participants (one European American, one Japanese) who were over 35 years old 
were excluded. Also, three Japanese participants who did not follow the instructions and 
an additional Japanese who had guessed about the purpose of the study were dropped 
from the analysis. Thus, the present data include 34 European Americans (18 females and 
16 males), 21 African Americans (13 females and 8 males), and 60 Japanese (25 females 
and 35 males). The mean ages of European American, African American, and Japanese 
participants were 20.10 (SD = 1.95), 20.62 (SD = 1.84), and 18.87 (SD = 1.17) 
respectively.  
 Procedure. The study was conducted under the guise of a music consumer survey 
sponsored by a CD retail company. Participants were greeted by a female experimenter 
and presented with a list of 30 CDs of popular music. They were asked to select 10 CDs 
they liked most among those that they did not own. They then rank-ordered the 10 CDs 
based on their preferences. While participants were continuing to work on an alleged 
music survey, the experimenter informed participants that the sponsor of the survey was 
offering a CD for each participant as a token of appreciation for participating in the 
survey. However, the experimenter also informed them that there were only two CDs in 
stock and showed those two CDs to the participants. In fact, those two CDs were the ones 
ranked fifth and sixth by the participants earlier, thus almost equally attractive. 
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Participants picked one and received it as a gift. At this point, the experimenter told all 
participants that she would need the first table to prepare for the next session and asked 
them to move to another table. Participants then switched tables and continued the 
alleged music survey. After they finished completing the survey (approximately 10 
minutes after the choice), they were told that the researchers also wanted to know how 
people would feel about CDs they had seen after they left a store because the impression 
of some CDs might remain stronger or better than others later on. Thus, participants were 
asked to rank-order the same 10 CDs again based on how they felt about the CDs right at 
the moment.  
 There were three conditions that differed in whether and when the face poster 
was presented. In the face-during-the-choice condition, the poster was placed only on the 
first table. In the face-after-the-choice condition, it was placed only on the second table 
and in the control condition, it was placed on neither.  
 Participants were then thoroughly debriefed about the full purpose of the study. 
None of participants in the two poster conditions raised any suspicions regarding the 
poster. When asked, they admitted that they saw the poster, but all of them denied any 
influences the poster could have on them. One participant, for example, said with a sense 
of disbelief expressed on his face: “I saw the poster, but I don’t think it had any influence 
on me.” All participants were politely asked to donate the CD they had received back to 
the study because the study was not actually sponsored by any company. All participants 
agreed to do so. They were thanked, and they received the initially promised payment. 
Results and Discussion 
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 The size of the dissonance effect was measured by a spreading of alternatives 
(SA) -- the sum of the amount of rank change for the chosen CD and the amount of rank 
change for the rejected CD. For example, if the chosen CD was initially ranked 6th but 
became 4th later, and if the rejected CD was initially ranked 5th but became 6th later, SA 
was recorded as 3 (SA could be negative if the chosen CD went down and/or the rejected 
CD went up). Preliminary analyses were conducted to compare European Americans 
and African Americans – the two groups hypothesized to be independent. The mean SAs 
of the two groups were very similar; in fact, in none of the three conditions did the mean 
difference approach statistical significance (all ts < 1). Thus, the two groups were 
subsequently combined. A 2 (country: Americans, Japanese) x 2 (gender: female, male) x 
3 (condition: during, after, control) ANOVA was initially performed on the SA index. 
However, gender showed no significant main effect or interactions, thus, it was omitted 
from further analyses. A 2 (country) x 3 (condition) ANOVA showed a significant 
interaction between country and condition, F (2, 109) = 7.20, p = .001, prep = .99, ηp2 
= .117. Pertinent means are shown in Figure 1.1.  
 We expected to replicate the earlier cross-cultural difference in the control 
condition. In this condition Americans should show a greater SA than Japanese would. 
We also predicted that the face effect observed by Kitayama et al. (2004) would be 
replicated in the face-during-the-choice condition. In this condition Japanese should show 
a greater SA than Americans would. Our third prediction was that the face poster would 
have no effect in the face-after-the-choice condition. The pattern of data in this condition 
should be no different from the one in the control condition.  
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 Consistent with our first prediction, Americans showed a reliable dissonance 
effect in the control condition, t (17) = 4.05, p = .001, prep = .99, but the Japanese mean 
was not different from zero, t (19) = 1.63, ns. This replicates earlier findings (Heine & 
Lehman, 1997; Hoshino-Browne et al., 2005; Kitayama et al.2004) although in the 
present case the cultural difference fell short of statistical significance, t (36) = 1.23, ns. 
 In support of the second prediction, the pattern was completely reversed in the 
face-during-the-choice condition. As in the Kitayama et al. (2004) study, Japanese 
showed a reliable justification effect, with the mean significantly greater than zero, t (19) 
= 8.94, p < .001, prep > .99, but the effect shown by Americans was much less although 
it was still significantly greater than zero, t (17) = 2.53, p < .05, prep = .92. The cultural 
difference in this condition was statistically significant, t (36) = 3.22, p < .01, prep = .97, 
d = 1.04. As predicted, Japanese showed a reliably greater SA in this condition than in 
the control condition, t (28.48) = 2.66, p < .05, prep = .94, d = .84. As was also predicted, 
Americans showed less SA in this condition than in the control condition, but this 
difference did not reach statistical significance, t (34) = 1.32, ns. A contrast representing 
the interaction between experimental condition (face-during-the-choice vs. control) and 
country was statistically significant, F (1, 72) = 7.92, p < .01, prep = .96, ηp2 = .099. 
 Finally, the means in the face-after-the-choice condition were more similar to 
those in the control condition than to those in the face-during-the-choice condition, thus 
providing support for our third prediction. Specifically, the Japanese mean in the 
face-after-the-choice condition was no different from the corresponding mean in the 
control condition, t (38) = .34, ns, although it was still significantly different from zero, t 
(19) = 2.36, p < .05, prep = .91. In contrast, the American mean in the 
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face-after-the-choice condition was significantly greater than zero, t (18) = 5.36, p < .001, 
prep = .99 as in the control condition. If anything, the mean was somewhat greater, albeit 
marginally, in the face-after-the-choice condition than in the control condition, t (33.31) 
= 1.77, p = .09, prep = .83, d = .58. An analogous effect has been observed by 
Baumeister and Tice (1984), who used an induced compliance paradigm to show that 
after a choice, a dissonance effect becomes especially pronounced if the chosen behavior 
is believed to be public than when it is believed to be private. It may be the case that 
non-Asian Americans are strongly motivated to express their personal choice if the 
chosen behavior is public.  
Experiment 2: Three Dots and Dissonance 
 Available evidence suggests that mere exposure to schematic faces is sufficient 
to moderate the cross-cultural difference in dissonance. Our assumption is that it does so 
by inducing an impression of public scrutiny. One can conceivably argue, however, that 
the schematic faces could induce some kinds of emotional reactions or simply distract 
attention away from the CD at issue. Although it is not immediately obvious how these 
possible confounds could account for the specific pattern of culture x face interaction, it 
is still advisable to explicitly address them.  
 In Experiment 2, we sought further evidence for the proposition that perception 
of a face critically moderates the cultural difference in dissonance in a condition that 
completely eliminates any possible confounds between the face-condition and the no-face 
condition. We did so by presenting participants with a cue that is interpretable as either a 
face or something else, and to compare those who perceive a face from the cue with those 
who do not. We predicted that both Asians who perceive a face and European Americans 
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who do not perceive a face would show a dissonance effect. In contrast, Asians who do 
not perceive a face and Europeans who perceive a face should show no dissonance effect.  
 Although participants in Experiment 1 were not aware of what effect the poster 
had on their behavior, our analysis implies that the poster may give rise to quite different 
subjective experiences of choice. That is, European Americans may be expected to feel 
the choice as socially constrained when they are under public scrutiny, which may in turn 
cause them to experience the choice as not reflective of their own preferences. Because of 
these subjective experiences of the choice, they no longer feel motivated to justify their 
choice. In contrast, Asians may be expected to experience public eyes not as constraint, 
but as a “sounding board” or as an implicit partner of social dialogue that constitutes their 
interdependence self. As a consequence, they may feel the choice as a genuine expression 
of their own preferences especially when they make the choice under public scrutiny. To 
test these ideas, we included two questions about subjective experience of the choice at 
the end of the study. They are “how much constraint they felt on their choice” and “how 
much their choice reflected their music preference.” 
 Experiment 2 tested whether the Japanese pattern could be replicated by another 
group known to be interdependent –Asian Americans. Hoshino-Browne et al. (2005) 
examined both Japanese and Asian Canadians in their free-choice dissonance studies and 
found the two groups to be no different. That is, people from both groups show no 
dissonance when they make a choice in private for themselves, but they show a strong 
dissonance effect when they make a choice for their friends. Experiment 2 examined 




 Participants. The study was conducted under the guise of a music survey 
sponsored by a CD retail company. Sixty-seven European American and 28 Asian 
American undergraduate students at the University of Michigan individually participated 
in the study in exchange for eight dollars. Seven participants were eliminated from the 
data analysis because three changed their mind after their choice, two correctly guessed 
the purpose of the study, and two did not follow the instruction properly. Thus, the 
current data included 62 European Americans (39 females and 23 males) and 26 Asian 
Americans (20 females and 6 males). Asian American participants consisted of 16 
Chinese Americans, six Korean Americans, two Japanese Americans, and two Filipino 
Americans. The mean age of European Americans and Asian Americans were 19.40 (SD 
= 1.29) and 19.58 (SD = 1.60) respectively.  
 Procedure. The procedure for the “music survey” was the same as in Experiment 
1 except for two points. First, instead of a poster with faces, a letter-size sheet of paper 
was placed in front of participants. At the center of the sheet, within an area defined by a 
30 mm radius, three black dots (each with 10 mm in diameter) were printed either in a 
triangular configuration or in a reversed triangular configuration (see Figure 1.2). Both 
configurations were expected to evoke mental representations of a face to an individually 
varying degree. Second, unlike Experiment 1, participants did not change seats; therefore, 
all participants were exposed to the three dots throughout the study. At the end of the 
experiment, participants were asked to help other researchers’ pilot study on “visual 
perception,” in which participants drew a picture incorporating the three dots on the sheet 
of paper. All participants agreed to do so. Regardless of the configurations or ethnicity of 
participants, exactly half of the participants (44) drew a face in the picture completion 
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task. Preliminary analysis revealed that the likelihood of drawing a face was no different 
whether participants had three dots in a triangular configuration or in a 
reversed-triangular configuration, x2(1) = 6.60, ns. Participants then reported, on a 7-point 
scale (1 = not at all, 7 = very strongly), how much constraint they felt during the choice 
and how much their choice reflected their music preferences. Participants were then 
thoroughly debriefed, thanked, and received the promised payment. 
Results and Discussion 
 We compared the justification effect between the participants who drew (and 
thus supposedly had perceived) a face and those who did not. No gender differences were 
found, thus this variable was omitted from the rest of the analyses. The SA index was 
submitted to a 2 (drawing: face, no face) x 2 (ethnicity: European, Asian) ANOVA. As 
predicted, a significant interaction was found between ethnicity and drawing, F (1, 84) = 
5.57, p < .05, prep = .93, ηp2 = .062. As shown in Figure 1.3, European Americans who 
drew a face showed a significantly smaller justification effect than those who did not 
draw a face, t (60) = 2.37, p < .05, prep = .93, d = .60. The pattern was reversed, albeit 
non-significantly, for Asian Americans, t (24) = 1.23, ns.  
 Further evidence was obtained from the subjective feelings about their choice 
(see Table 1.1). As predicted, European Americans reported experiencing less constraint 
and, moreover, felt that their choice reflected their own preferences more strongly when 
they did not see a face than when they did: t (60) = 2.19, p < .05, prep = .91, d = .56 and t 
(60) = 2.10, p <.05, prep = .89, d = .53 for the two measures, respectively. Interestingly, 
both effects were reversed non-significantly for Asian Americans. The interaction 
between ethnicity and face was at least marginally significant for the perceived constraint 
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and the reflectiveness judgment: F (1, 84) = 3.44, p = .07, prep = .86, ηp2 = .039 and F (1, 
84) = 4.71, p < .05, prep = .90, ηp2 = .053, respectively.  
Experiment 3: Perceived Social Influence and Dissonance 
 One finding that is novel and, thus, requires a full explanation is the effect of 
watching others among European Americans. Our interpretation is that in European 
American cultural contexts, public scrutiny is interpreted as a constraint on the choice. 
Experiment 2 found initial evidence for this interpretation by examining subjective 
experience of choice. European Americans who saw a face experienced their choice as 
more constrained and less reflective of their preferences than those who did not see a face. 
However, the evidence is correlational. It is desirable to experimentally manipulate the 
perceived constraint or influence and see if the dissonance effect would disappear only 
when watching faces are seen as influential and constraining. 
 In Experiment 3, we manipulated impressions associated with watching others. 
We predicted that European Americans would continue to show a reliable dissonance 
effect even when they make a choice in front of eyes of others so long as they perceive 
these others as passive and innocuous and thus unlikely to exert any social influence.  
Method 
 Participants. Thirty-six European American undergraduates (20 females and 16 
males) at the University of Michigan individually participated in the study in exchange 
for eight dollars. Three participants were eliminated from the data analysis because one 
knew the experimenter personally, one guessed that we were interested in ranking 
changes after the choice, and one did not follow instructions. Thus, the current data 
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include 33 European Americans (18 females and 15 males). The mean age was 18.97 
years old (SD = .95).  
 Procedure. Within the procedure similar to Experiments 1 and 2, we subtly 
manipulated the impressions associated with watching others on the poster in Experiment 
3. Upon arrival for the alleged music survey, participants were unexpectedly asked to 
participate in another short study on “impression formation” in exchange for an 
additional two dollars. All participants agreed to do so. In this “impression formation” 
study, participants watched one of two versions of a 5-minute video clip in which two 
male college students discussed their class project. In one version, a target person (see 
Figure 1.4) played the role of an “influencer” who took initiatives, made concrete plans, 
and acted in a confident, dominant manner while the other person played the role of an 
“influencee” who acted submissively, merely accepting the suggestions made by the 
target person. The other version of the video was identical except that the two actors 
switched the roles (i.e., the target person played an “influencee”). Participants reported 
their impressions of the two people. As predicted, the target person was perceived as far 
more confident, influential, and dominant (relative to his partner) in the former version 
than in the latter version (p <.001). Thus, the manipulation was successful.  
 In the subsequent alleged music survey, all participants were seated in front of a 
poster. This time, however, the poster contained realistic images of faces rather than 
schematic drawings. These images were created by morphing each of 10 different 
Caucasian male faces with the face of the target person. As shown in Figure 1.4, general 
resemblances existed between the face of the target person and the faces on the poster. 
Importantly, however, the resemblances were not easily recognizable unless explicitly 
 
 29
pointed out. In fact, when later probed, no participants noticed any connections between 
the faces on the poster and the “impression formation” study they had participated in 
earlier. The rest of the “music survey” procedure was the same as in Experiment 2.  
Results and Discussion 
 We predicted that European Americans would show a substantial dissonance 
effect in the “public” choice condition only when the faces on the poster resembled 
someone who was very non-influential, submissive, and thus innocuous. As expected, a 
justification effect in the “influencer” condition (M = .44, SD = 1.21) was no different 
from zero, t (15) = 1.45, ns. This effect was quite comparable to the effect shown by 
Kitayama et al. (2004) in their “public” choice condition as well as in the 
face-during-the-choice condition in Experiment 1 of the present research. Thus, it seems 
that the schematic faces on the poster used in Experiment 1 were, by default, perceived as 
influencing the choice. Importantly, as predicted by the current analysis, we found a 
reliable justification effect in the “influencee” condition (M = 1.82, SD = 1.29), t (16) = 
5.65, p < .001, prep >.99. Again this effect was comparable in size to the finding in the 
private conditions of the earlier studies. It therefore appears that once perceived as 
non-influential, the watching eyes became equal to non-existent in terms of its effect on 
their choice. The difference between the two conditions was statistically significant, t 
(31) = 3.18, p < .01, prep = .97, d = 1.11. No gender differences were found.  
General Discussion 
Self-Esteem, Face/Honor, and Dissonance 
 One overarching thesis of the current work concerns two qualitatively different 
types of dissonance process. In independent cultural contexts, choices were expected to 
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become self-threatening when they were perceived as private and thus unconstrained. In 
support of this analysis, we found that European and African Americans show a 
dissonance effect only when a choice is perceived as personal and private. When a choice 
was made under perceived public scrutiny, their dissonance effect faded away. In contrast, 
in interdependent cultural contexts, choices were predicted to become self-threatening 
when they were experienced as publicly exposed. In support of this idea, we found that 
Japanese and Asian Americans show a dissonance effect only when an impression of 
public scrutiny is induced during choice.   
 A particularly important contribution of the present series of experiments is that 
they demonstrate the boundary conditions for a dissonance effect both among European 
(and African) Americans and among Asians. First, exposure to faces increased the 
dissonance effect for Asians but reduced it for European/African Americans. More 
precisely, this cross-cultural pattern was found only when exposure to faces took place 
during choice. The exposure caused no visible effect if it happened after the choice. 
Second, European Americans did not lose the dissonance effect even under perceived 
public scrutiny when they perceived the watching others as non-influential, submissive, 
and thus innocuous. 
 At the same time, the present analysis is in agreement with a general notion that 
the self is deeply involved in the dissonance process (Aronson, 1968) and, more 
specifically, with a hypothesis that dissonance effect is mediated by a threat to self-image 
(Steele, 1988). Yet, it significantly extended these analyses by proposing that the 
dissonance effect takes remarkably divergent forms depending on the nature of the 
self-images involved in the process. Cross-culturally contrasting effects of eyes of others 
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demonstrate that for people engaging in independent cultural contexts, a choice becomes 
expressive of the self and thus subjectively authentic when made in private, outside of 
any meaningful social context. In fact, we obtained evidence that European Americans 
felt their choice to be more reflective of themselves more when there were no public eyes. 
What is at stake in a choice like this is the evaluation of the self as seen from oneself. In 
agreement with current theories in social psychology (see Baumeister, 1998, for a review), 
a threat to self-esteem is the key in dissonance. In contrast, for those engaging in 
interdependent contexts, a choice becomes self-involving and thus is subjectively 
experienced as authentic when made in relational contexts. In support of this notion, we 
found that Asian Americans tended to see their choice as more reflective of themselves 
when they perceived public eyes. What is at stake here is the evaluation of the self that is 
held by others. This kind of evaluation is more akin to face or honor – a positive 
evaluation that is conferred on the self by others. Face or honor can be quite independent 
of what the self thinks him or herself to be.  
Cultural Grounding of Dissonance 
 Although social psychologists have long seen dissonance as purely 
psychological, our findings make it clear that this psychological process is closely 
interwoven with the culturally specific meanings of choice. In European American 
cultural contexts, a choice symbolizes personal freedom. Thus, having more options to 
choose from is considered to be a good thing. Indeed, the United States is the only 
country where people prefer to have more than 50 choices of ice cream (Rozin, Fischer, 
Shields, & Masson, 2006), and people are more satisfied with a product they choose than 
a product chosen by an experimenter (Snibbe & Markus, 2005; Brehm, Stires, Sensenig, 
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& Shaban, 1966). By making a choice that is different from the rest, non-Asian 
Americans can demonstrate how uniquely different they are from others (Kim & Markus, 
1999). Furthermore, individuals become more motivated and work harder on a task they 
have chosen by themselves (Iyenger & Lepper, 1999; Na & Kitayama, 2007). In other 
words, personal choice in Euro-American cultural contexts is both a symbol of freedom 
and one’s uniqueness and a source of satisfaction and motivation.  
 In Asian interdependent cultural contexts, however, the notion of free choice is 
neither as salient nor important as it is in Euro-American independent cultural contexts. 
On the contrary, having a strong personal preference or opinion may become a source of 
stress as one has to suppress it to maintain social harmony. Yet, choice has an important 
function for Asians as well. For example, when Asians are given a choice, they tend to 
choose the one that is the same as the rest (Kim & Markus, 1999). Also, they are more 
motivated and work hard on a task chosen by important others (Iyenger & Lepper, 2007). 
In other words, choice in Asian cultural contexts provides a way to get connected with 
others, show their conformity, and meet others’ expectations or standards. Our findings 
have added evidence to these ideas and shown that Asians are much more motivated to 
justify public choices than personal choices. 
The Cultural Unconscious 
 One important contribution of the current work is to establish that the extent of 
the post-decisional dissonance effect is importantly moderated by the activation of face 
representations. This activation, in turn, leads to culturally specific strategies to cope with 
public scrutiny. Thus, non-Asian Americans coped with public scrutiny by refraining 
from justifying their choice because they could defend their sense of independence by 
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attributing their dissonance to the influence of the watching others. In contrast, Asians 
and Asian Americans coped with public scrutiny by justifying their choice because the 
public eyes of others define a constitutive element of their interdependent self.  
 It is noteworthy that no participants thought that anyone was watching them. 
They merely saw graphic stimuli that activated face representations. This demonstrates, 
then, that the link between the activation of face representations and the recruitment of 
the coping strategies is automatic and largely unconscious. This conclusion is consistent 
with a large body of studies on face processing, which suggest that face-like stimuli are 
processed automatically by a particular region of the brain that is dedicated to face 
perception (Farah, Wilson, Drain, & Tanaka, 1998; Kanwisher, McDermott, & Chun, 
1997). We speculate that when face representations are automatically and subconsciously 
activated, this activation in turn effectively triggers the culturally appropriate strategies of 
coping with public scrutiny. As observed by Bargh and Morsella (in press), the 
unconscious appears to be quite adaptive and even smart. We wish to add to this that the 
adaptiveness and intelligence of the unconscious is sometimes defined in relation to the 
cultural environment of each individual. 
Conclusions and Future Directions 
 In music, dissonance refers to a disagreeable combination of sounds that is 
considered to suggest unrelieved tension and to require resolution (The American 
Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, 2006). Dissonance in psychology refers to 
something analogous in the mental domain. It refers to patterns of cognition that are 
perceived as disruptive of the stable sense of things one cares about in general (Aronson, 
1967; Cooper & Fazio, 1984; Festinger, 1957) and that of the self in particular (Steele, 
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1988). We have built on this general conceptual framework of dissonance theory in 
psychology and shown that dissonance takes cross-culturally divergent forms because of 
the corresponding differences in the culturally sanctioned forms of the self. For people 
engaging in cultures that emphasize independence of the self, dissonance is caused by a 
threat to the personal self. As such, it is propagated by choices that are perceived as 
private and thus revealing of the personal self. In contrast, for those engaging in cultures 
that sanction interdependence of the self, dissonance is caused by a threat to the public 
self and, as such, it is produced by choices that are perceived as under public scrutiny and 
thus as implicating one’s honor and face.  
 The present work has left open three important classes of questions about 
dissonance. First, we did not examine any within-culture variations. Nonetheless, the 
present analysis does imply that the culturally divergent forms of dissonance are likely to 
be most pronounced for those individuals who are strongly committed to the particular 
views of the self that are sanctioned in a particular cultural context. Individual differences 
on the pertinent dimensions should be explored to see if the dissonance effects we 
observed in the current work might be moderated by such variables. Second, the 
hypothesis of dissonance as automatic and largely unconscious must be further 
investigated. One promising way of addressing the unconscious nature of dissonance 
might be to explore brain pathways that are automatically recruited when dissonance is 
experienced by people in varying cultural contexts. Lastly, future work should address 
developmental questions: How early in socialization do children begin to show the 
culturally appropriate forms of dissonance, and is dissonance a consequence or a 
precursor of the establishment of the culturally appropriate forms of the self? We believe 
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that by addressing these three types of questions it will be possible to fully understand the 




Table 1.1  
Mean scores of perceived constraint on choice and choice as reflection of the self 
(Experiment 2) 
 
 Constraint Reflection of Self 
No Face Face No Face Face 
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Justification effect (as assessed by spreading of alternatives, SA) for Japanese and 
American participants in the no-face (control), the face-during-the-choice, and the 
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Justification effect (as assessed by spreading of alternatives, SA) for Asian and European 
Americans who drew a face and who did not (Experiment 2). Error bars represent 



















The target person in the video clip (left) and the poster (right) used in Experiment 3. The 
faces in the poster were created by morphing 10 different Caucasian male faces with the 
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Americans Feel Proud While Japanese Feel Lucky: 
Cultural Differences in Appraisal and Corresponding Emotion 
 
 Appraisal theories of emotion propose that emotions result from people’s 
interpretations and explanations of events (e.g., Ellsworth, 1994; Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 
1995, Scherer, 1988). Thus, if individuals interpret a situation differently, they should 
experience different emotions. Appraisals, in turn, can be affected by motivation 
(Baumeister, 1998). People often see what they are looking for. 
 Numerous studies have documented that people select or distort information so 
as to see themselves in a positive light. For example, the cognitive dissonance literature 
has shown that people re-interpret their own behavior so that a positive self-image is 
protected or affirmed (e.g., Steele, 1988; Tavris & Aronson, 2007). People tend to believe 
that they contributed more than their partners in collaborative tasks (e.g., Ross & Sicoly, 
1979; Burros, 1988) and often engage in downward social comparison in order to feel 
good about themselves (e.g., Hakmiller, 1996; Wills, 1981; Wood, 1989). Moreover, a 
majority of people see themselves as better than average on many dimensions (e.g., 
Lovett, 1997; Headey & Wearing, 1987; Guerin, 1994; McKenna & Myers, 1997; 
Svenson, 1981; Wylie, 1979) and evaluate others in terms of the dimensions on which 




 One of the most frequently studied self-serving biases involves people’s causal 
attributions for success and failure. Many studies have demonstrated that people account 
for success and failure in ways that will enhance or maintain their self-esteem. For 
example, athletes commonly explain victories in terms of their ability and effort but 
attribute losses to something else, such as biased referees or the other team’s dirty tactics 
(Grove, Hanrahan, & McInman, 1991; Lalonde, 1992; Mullen & Riordan, 1988). When 
participants worked on achievement tasks and received manipulated feedback, they were 
likely to make internal attributions for success but external attributions for failure (Miller 
& Ross, 1975; Zuckerman, 1977 for reviews).  
 In North America, these self-enhancing and self-protective biases are pervasive 
and considered to be conducive to mental health (e.g., Abramson, Metalsky, & Alloy, 
1989; Taylor & Brown, 1988). However, accumulating cross-cultural evidence suggests 
that such self-serving biases are largely absent in East Asian cultures. For example, 
Japanese do not evaluate themselves as better than average even on attributes considered 
to be important in Japanese culture, such as cooperation and loyalty (Heine & Lehman, 
1997; Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Canadian Asians seek more upward social 
comparisons than do European Canadians (White & Lehman, 2005), and Japanese tend to 
remember incidents that decreased their self-esteem, whereas Americans tend to 
remember incidents that increased it (Kitayama, Markus, Matsumoto, & Norasakkunkit, 
1997). Moreover, Japanese attribute failures to themselves as much as or sometimes even 
more than successes, failing to show the self-serving attribution biases that are pervasive 
among North Americans (Kitayama, Takagi, Matsumoto, 1995). In sum, people in North 
American cultural contexts are motivated to maintain a positive view of the self and 
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achieve this goal by engaging in various self-serving biases whereas people in Asian 
contexts not only fail to show such self-serving biases, but sometimes exhibit 
self-effacing or self-critical tendencies. 
 These cultural differences in self-serving biases should have implications for 
people’s emotional responses to their own success and failure experiences. The universal 
contingency hypothesis proposes that people in different cultures will experience similar 
emotions to the extent that they appraise the situation in similar ways (Ellsworth, 1994; 
Mesquita & Ellsworth, 2001). Thus, if people’s appraisal patterns differ across cultures, 
their emotional experiences should differ correspondingly. In the research reported here, 
we focus particularly on appraisals of agency. Since agency is one of the most important 
appraisals that differentiate negative emotional experiences (Ellsworth & Smith, 1988), 
cross-cultural differences in agency appraisal should have important implications for 
people’s emotional responses.  
 For example, when experiencing success, people generally feel positive 
emotions, but the type of positive emotion depends on the attribution of agency. For 
example, if people attribute success to themselves, they experience emotions such as 
pride, satisfaction, superiority, and confidence (positive self-agency emotions), but if 
people believe that their success was due to other people, they experience quite different 
emotions such as gratitude, obligation, modesty, and friendly feelings towards those 
people (positive other-agency emotions). If the success is seen as caused by impersonal 
circumstances, people feel lucky and happily surprised (positive situation-agency 
emotions). We hypothesized that Americans, who tend to be self-enhancing, would 
attribute success to themselves and, as a result, experience strong positive self-agency 
 
 48
emotions such as pride. In contrast, Asians, who are more self-effacing, would attribute 
their success to external factors and, as a result, experience positive other-agency or 
situation-agency emotions such as gratitude. 
 Likewise, when experiencing failure, people generally feel negative emotions, 
but the type of negative emotion depends on the attribution of agency. If people blame 
themselves, they experience shame, regret, self-critical feelings, and anger towards 
themselves (negative self-agency emotions), but if people blame others, they experience 
anger, resentment, hostility, and unfriendly feelings towards those people (negative 
other-agency emotions). If people believe the failure is due to uncontrollable 
circumstances, they feel unlucky and disappointed (negative situation-agency emotions). 
Then, we hypothesized that Americans, who are motivated to protect their self-esteem, 
would blame their failures on external factors and, as a result, experience negative other- 
or situation-agency emotions such as anger. In contrast, we expected that Asians, who 
tend to be self-critical, would blame themselves for failure, and experience negative 
self-agency emotions such as shame.  
 Combining appraisal theories of emotion with evidence of cultural differences in 
attributions of success and failure, we hypothesized that people in North American 
contexts and Asian contexts experience different emotions in response to success and 
failure. To test this idea, we asked Japanese and American participants to think about 
situations in which they had succeeded or failed and describe what caused the events and 
to what extent they experienced various emotions (Study 1). We also hypothesized that if 
people in different cultures appraise situations in the same way, they should experience 
the same emotions. We attempted to induce Japanese and Americans participants to make 
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the same appraisals, and predicted that cultural differences in emotions would decrease 
(Study 2). We examined both personal situations (i.e., a course grade) and social 
situations (i.e., an interaction with another person).  
Study 1: Appraisal and Emotion in Remembered Successes and Failures 
 In Study 1 we predicted that Americans and Japanese would make different 
causal attributions for success and failure as past research has found, and attempted to 
discover whether their emotions were contingent on their attributions. We asked 
participants to think about successes and failures they had actually experienced in the 
past and describe the causes of the incidents and their emotional responses. We predicted 
that because of their self-enhancing and self-protecting motivations, Americans would 
tend to attribute success to themselves and, as a consequence, experience self-agency 
emotions such as pride, while they would attribute failure to external factors and 
experience other- or situation-agency emotions, such as anger. We also predicted that 
because of their self-effacing and self-criticizing tendencies, Japanese would attribute 
success to external factors and, as a consequence, experience other- or situation-agency 
emotions such as gratitude, but would attribute failure to themselves and experience 
self-agency emotions such as shame. 
Method 
Participants 
 Sixty-seven Caucasian American undergraduates at the University of Michigan 
(36 females, 31 males) and 58 Japanese undergraduates at Kanazawa University (39 
females, 19 males) participated in the study for partial class credit (Americans) or a 
500-yen book coupon (Japanese). The mean age of the American participants (M = 18.73, 
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SD = .91) did not statistically differ from that of Japanese participants (M = 18.40, SD 
= .53).  
Procedure 
 The study was conducted in small groups of five to ten people. Participants were 
told that the purpose of the study was to understand people’s emotions in various 
situations and were given a questionnaire. The questionnaires were created in English, 
translated into Japanese, and back-translated to English to make sure that the English and 
Japanese versions had equivalent content. In the questionnaire, participants were asked to 
think about particular situations they had experienced in their past as vividly as possible 
and to write brief descriptions of the situations. Each questionnaire included two of four 
types of situations: 1) receiving a grade that was much better than usual (personal 
success), 2) receiving a grade that was much worse than usual (personal failure), 3) 
getting along well with someone when they did not expect to (social success), and 4) not 
getting along well with someone when they expected to (social failure). Each participant 
wrote about two of the four situations, which were counterbalanced for personal/social 
and success/failure: If the first situation was about personal success, the second situation 
was about social failure.  
 After briefly describing the situation, participants rated the possible causes of the 
incident (i.e., the self, other person, and circumstance) on a scale of 0 (not at all) to 8 
(very much). Then they rated the degree to which they experienced each of 36 different 
emotions on a scale of 0 (not at all) to 8 (very much). These emotions included six types 
of emotions: positive self-agency (proud, confident, satisfied, superior), positive 
other-agency (grateful, friendly, obligated, humble), positive situation-agency (lucky, 
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happily surprised), negative self-agency (ashamed, self-critical, regretful, angry at self), 
negative other-agency (resentful, angry, unfriendly, hostile), and negative 
situation-agency (unlucky, disappointed). Also, there were 16 filler emotions such as 
relaxed and anxious. We pre-tested the correlation between the three types of agency 
appraisals and corresponding emotions and found that all but four emotions were 
significantly or at least marginally correlated with the corresponding agency appraisal. 
The four emotions that failed to show the correlations were humble, hostile, happily 
surprised, and disappointed. These emotions were dropped from the analysis. The 
reliabilities (Cronbach’s alphas) for the positive self-agency, positive other-agency, 
negative self-agency, and negative other-agency emotions were .81, .65, .87, and .76, 
respectively. Cronbach’s alphas were not computed for the positive and negative 
situation-agency emotions because each had only one emotion (i.e., lucky, unlucky). 
 To examine individual differences, we also included the Singelis Self-Construal 
Scale (1994) for independence-interdependence orientation, Rosenberg’s Self-Esteem 
Scale (1965), the Contingencies of Self-Worth Scale (academic contingency items only; 
Crocker, 2003), and the Relationship Contingencies of Self-Worth Scale (Uchida, in 
press). Because our analysis of culturally congruent appraisals is based on the culturally 
sanctioned motivation for self-enhancement in the American context as opposed to the 
culturally sanctioned inclination to self-criticism in the Japanese context, we expected 
that individuals’ cultural identification and self-esteem level might explain any cultural 
differences in appraisal and emotion we might observe. That is, we expected to find that 
Americans would report stronger self-agency emotions in a success situation as a result 
of their self-attribution, and they would report stronger other- and/or situation-agency 
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emotions in a failure situation as a result of their external attribution. At the same time, 
we expected to find the opposite patterns among Japanese. We also predicted that these 
cultural differences might be significantly reduced when we statistically control for the 
cultural identification or self-esteem variables.  
Results and Discussion 
Correlations between Appraisal and Emotion Types 
 To test whether attributing the incidents to a particular causal agent (i.e., self, 
other people, situation) corresponded to type of emotion, Pearson correlations were 
computed between agency appraisal and emotion. For this analysis, personal and social 
situations were collapsed. As shown in Table 2.1, self-agency appraisal and self-agency 
emotions, other-agency appraisal and other-agency emotions, and situation-agency 
appraisal and situation-caused emotion showed significant positive correlations except 
that grateful and lucky feelings did not reach significance. Also, there are some cultural 
variations in the degree of correlations; in comparison to Japanese, Americans’ friendly 
and unfriendly feelings were correlated much less with appraisals of other agency. 
However, the majority of the correlations suggest that agency appraisals did correspond 
to types of emotions.  
Agency Appraisals 
 The four types of situation were first analyzed separately. The ratings for the 
agency appraisals were analyzed with mixed-design ANOVAs with culture and gender as 
between-subject factors and agency appraisal (self, other people, and situation) as a 
within subject variable. The means, standard deviations, ANOVA results, and effect sizes 
are shown in Table 2.2. Gender effects and interactions are reported only when they 
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reached significance. Independent-sample and paired-sample t-tests were also computed 
to further examine the between- and within-culture differences. 
 Personal situations. In the personal success condition, in which participants 
remembered receiving a good grade, the main effect for agency appraisal and the Culture 
x Appraisal interaction were significant. In both cultures, the self was seen as most 
responsible for success, while other people were seen as least responsible. The most 
notable cultural difference involved the degree of situation-agency appraisal. Japanese 
attributed their personal success to the situation significantly more than did Americans, t 
(61.43) = 4.67, p < .001, d = 1.16. Also, Americans’ self-attribution was significantly 
greater than their attribution to others, t (33) = 6.06, p < .001, and than their attribution to 
the situation, t (33) = 6.92, p <.001. In contrast, Japanese gave as much credit to the 
situation as to themselves, t (29) = 1.37, ns.  
 In the personal failure condition, both the main effect for agency appraisal and 
the Culture x Appraisal interaction were again significant. While self-agency was 
significantly greater than other-agency or situation-agency appraisals in both cultures, 
Japanese self-agency appraisal was significantly higher than that of Americans, t (59) = 
3.31, p <.01, d = .84. 
 When personal success situations were compared with personal failure situations, 
Japanese self-agency appraisal was marginally greater in the failure situations than in the 
success situations, t (56) = 1.86, p = .068, d = .49, but their attribution to others and to 
situational factors were greater in the personal success situations than in the personal 
failure situations, t (56) = 1.95, p = .056, d = .51; t (56) = 4.29, p < .001, d = 1.13, 
respectively. By contrast, Americans’ self-agency appraisal was significantly greater in 
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the personal success situations than in the personal failure situations, t (65) = 3.27, p 
< .01, d = .80, but their situation-agency appraisal was marginally greater for failure than 
for success, t (65) = 1.94, p = .056, d = .48. 
 Overall, these findings suggest that Americans are more likely to make 
self-enhancing and self-protective appraisals. While Japanese attributed personal success 
both to themselves and to the situation, Americans primarily attributed it to themselves. 
Also, Americans blamed their personal failure on others and the situation more than did 
Japanese. 
 Social situations. Not surprisingly, other people are much more salient in social 
situations than in personal situations in both cultures. In the social success situations, in 
which participants remembered a successful interaction with another person, agency 
appraisals were quite similar in the two cultures. While the main effect for appraisal was 
significant, no significant differences were found among the three types of appraisal in 
either culture (all ts < 1.09, ns.) except that Japanese situation-agency appraisal was 
marginally greater than their self-agency appraisal, t (27) = 1.76, p = .089.  
 Cultural differences were more pronounced for memories of social failure. While 
Japanese saw themselves, other people, and situational forces as more or less equally 
responsible for their social failures, Americans blamed other people more than 
themselves, t (33) = 5.09, p < .001, or the situation, t (33) = 2.84, p < .01, in keeping with 
the cultural bias towards self-enhancement. Indeed, Americans blamed themselves for 
social failure less, t (62) = 3.05, p < .01, d = .76, and blamed other people more, t (62) = 
2.89, p < .01, d =.72, than did the Japanese. When success and failure conditions were 
compared, Japanese saw themselves as more responsible for their failures, t (65) = 2.37, p 
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< .05, d = .62, while Americans saw other people as marginally more responsible for their 
failures, t (65) = 1.62, p = .10, d = .40. 
 In short, cultural differences in appraisal were more apparent in the social failure 
situations than the social success situations. As predicted, the Japanese took 
responsibility for social failures, whereas the Americans blamed other people.  
Agency-related Emotions 
 The mean rating scores for the emotions associated with the three types of 
agency (self, other people, situation) were submitted to a mixed-design ANOVA with 
culture and gender as between-subject factors and emotion type as a within subject 
variable. Positive emotions were analyzed in the success conditions, and negative 
emotions were analyzed in the failure conditions. The means, standard deviations, 
ANOVA results, and effect sizes are shown in Table 2.3. No significant gender effects 
were found. To further examine between and within cultural differences, 
independent-sample and paired-sample t-tests were computed.  
 Personal situations. In the personal success condition, the main effect for 
emotion type and the Culture x Emotion interaction were significant. Overall, Japanese 
participants’ emotions reflected their agency appraisals: They reported experiencing 
emotions associated with self- and situation- agencies more strongly than other-agency 
emotions, t (29) = 7.54, p < .001, t (29) = 4.22, p < .001 respectively, although their 
self-agency emotions were stronger than their situation-agency emotion, t (29) = 2.20, p 
< .05. On the other hand, Americans’ emotions were less reflective of their appraisals: 
While they experienced self-agency emotions most strongly, they also experienced 
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other-agency emotions quite strongly. In fact, Americans felt other-agency emotions 
significantly more strongly than did Japanese, t (61) = 2.76, p < .01, d = .68.  
 In the personal failure condition, Japanese participants’ emotions also 
corresponded to their appraisals: They attributed their failures to themselves, and they 
experienced the self-agency emotions more than other-agency or situation-agency 
emotions, t (27) = 8.00, p < .001, t (27) = 5.86, p < .001 respectively. Americans, too, 
experienced self-agency emotions most strongly, but they also experienced significantly 
stronger other-agency emotions than did Japanese, t (59) = 3.31, p < .01, d = .84. 
 Overall, Japanese emotions reflected their agency appraisals. In remembering 
both personal successes and failures, the degree to which they attributed the incidents to 
each causal agent closely resembled the degree to which they experienced the 
corresponding emotions. However, this was less true for Americans, in particular because 
of their experience of other-agency emotions. Since others are little involved in the 
personal incidents (which is evident from their free descriptions), such strong emotion 
towards others seems rather peculiar. The means of the three emotions comprising the 
other-agency positive emotions (friendly, grateful, and obligated) in the personal success 
condition were all significantly different between Japanese and Americans (Ms = 2.90 vs. 
6.30; 3.90 vs. 6.15, and 3.10 vs. 1.06, for Japanese and Americans respectively), but the 
largest cultural difference was found for the friendly feeling, t (61) = 5.77, p<.001, d = 
1.49. Also, the means of the three emotions comprising the other-agency negative 
emotions (unfriendly, angry, and resentful) in the personal failure condition were all 
significantly different between Japanese and Americans (Ms = 2.32 vs. 6.30, 3.11 vs. 4.58, 
and 2.39 vs. 4.97 for Japanese and Americans respectively), but the largest cultural 
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difference was found for the unfriendly feeling, t (59) = 5.52, p<.001, d=1.62. As 
indicated in Table 2.1, these emotions were less induced by other-agency appraisal 
among Americans in comparison to Japanese. It therefore seems that Americans feel 
friendly in personal successes but feel unfriendly towards other people in personal 
failures even towards others who are not involved in the incidents.  
 Social situations. In experiences of social success, the main effect for emotion 
type and the Culture x Emotion interaction reached significance. Although Japanese 
self-attributions were not different from their attributions to other people or the situation, 
their self-agency emotions were significantly weaker than their other-agency and 
situation-agency emotions, t (27) = 4.80, p < .001, t (27) = 2.64, p < .05, respectively. 
Also, Japanese’ self-agency emotion was significantly weaker than that of Americans, t 
(58) = 2.29, p < .05, d = .59. Americans, on the other hand, experienced the three types of 
emotions about equally (just as they attributed their social success to the three types of 
agency equally). 
 In the social failure condition, the main effect for emotion type and the Culture x 
Emotion interaction were significant. Americans’ emotions reflected their appraisals; 
they experienced other-agency emotion more strongly than self-agency or 
situation-agency emotions, t (33) = 6.21, p < .001, t (33) = 2.69, p < .05, respectively. 
Japanese emotions also matched their appraisals. As we found that Japanese attributed 
social failure to themselves more than did Americans, they also experienced self-agency 
emotions more strongly than did Americans, t (62) = 3.24, p < .01, d = .81. 
 As the cultural difference in agency appraisals was more significant in the social 
failure situations than in the social success situations, the cultural difference in emotions 
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was also more clearly demonstrated in the social failure situations. The overall patterns of 
emotion resembled the appraisal pattern in both success and failure situations, except that 
Japanese experienced somewhat less self-agency emotion than we might expect from the 
degree of their self-agency appraisal.  
Measures for Individual Differences 
 We also included four measures that assessed individual differences, speculating 
that independent-interdependent cultural orientation or the level of self-esteem might 
contribute to the cultural differences in appraisals and emotions. As expected, Americans 
scored significantly higher than Japanese on three of the four measures – the Singelis 
Self-Construal Scale, Rosenberg’s Self-Esteem Scale, and Crocker’s Academic 
Contingent Self-Esteem Scale, t (115) = 5.14, p < .001, d = .95, t (109) = 2.44, p < .05, d 
= .48, t (122) = 6.86, p < .001, d = 1.23, respectively. The Relationship Contingencies of 
Self-Worth Scale did not reach significance. To examine the effect of these variables on 
appraisals and emotions, the mean scores were entered one at a time as a covariate in the 
Culture x Appraisal and Culture x Emotion mixed-design ANOVAs. This analysis was 
done separately for each condition (personal success, personal failure, etc.). None of 
these measures interacted significantly with appraisal or emotion.  
 The null findings on these measures suggest that neither individuals’ cultural 
orientation nor their level of self-esteem was responsible for the cultural differences in 
appraisals or emotions. However, it is also possible that these explicit self-report 
measures failed to capture individuals’ implicit attitudes, which might be more strongly 
associated with their appraisals and emotions. After all, if one were conscious of one’s 
self-enhancing biases, they would no longer be so effective in enhancing the self.  
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Study 2: Free and Induced Appraisal and Emotion in Hypothetical Situations 
 Consistent with past research, Study 1 found that appraisals tended to be 
self-enhancing in Americans and self-effacing in Japanese. More important, Study 1 
found that these culturally different appraisals of the situations corresponded to different 
emotions in Americans and Japanese. These findings support our hypothesis that 
Americans and Japanese experience different emotions because they appraise the same 
situation in different ways. 
 If the cultural differences in experienced emotions are largely due to culturally 
divergent appraisals, it should follow that if Americans and Japanese appraise the 
situation in the same way, the cultural differences in emotions should disappear or 
decrease significantly. To test this hypothesis, we prepared two types of vignettes – some 
with no information about the cause of the incident (free-appraisal vignettes) and others 
that described a specific causal factor (induced-appraisal vignettes). We expected to find 
that participants who read the vignettes with causal information would show significantly 
less cultural difference in their emotion. 
 Moreover, we included an additional measure to assess individuals’ 
self-enhancing tendency. We suspected that the failure to find any effect of cultural 
orientation or self-esteem in Study 1 might be due to the use of explicit measures. 
Therefore, in Study 2, we used a measure designed to assess individuals’ self-enhancing 
tendency more implicitly by asking participants to estimate the percentage of the 
population of the same age and gender as themselves that is better than they are with 
respect to ten different aspects (e.g., intelligent, considerate; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; 
Heine & Lehman, 1997). It should be noted that this “percentage-estimate” measure is 
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different from the “better-than-average” measure (i.e., rating the self in comparison to an 
‘average’ other), which was recently suggested as artificially inflating the magnitude of 
self-enhancement (Heine, Kitayama, & Hamamura, 2007). We speculated that 
individuals’ self-enhancing tendency captured by the “percentage estimate” measure 
might contribute to cultural differences in agency appraisals and emotions.  
Method 
Participants  
 One hundred twenty-five Caucasian American undergraduates at the University 
of Michigan (59 females, 66 males) and 183 Japanese undergraduates at Kanazawa 
University (124 females, 59 males) participated in the study for partial class credit 
(Americans) or a 500-yen book coupon (Japanese). The mean age of the American 
participants was 18.67 (SD = .93), and that of Japanese participants was 19.45 (SD = 
1.58). Although the age difference between these two groups was significant, t (298.79) = 
5.39, p < .001, d = .60, we found no correlation between age and other variables 
examined in this study. Thus age was omitted from the analyses. 
Procedure  
 The procedure was mostly the same as in Study 1. The main difference was that 
instead of thinking about their own experiences, participants in Study 2 read vignettes 
and imagined themselves in the situations described. As in Study 1, there were four types 
of situation: Personal success, personal failure, social success, and social failure. For the 
each situation, there were two types of vignettes – free-appraisal vignettes and 
induced-appraisal vignettes (see Appendix). The free-appraisal vignettes did not include 
any information about the cause of the incident, but the induced-appraisal vignettes 
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included additional information about one of the three types of causal agency (self, other 
person, or situation). Thus, there were a total of 16 different vignettes, and each 
questionnaire included two of them, counterbalanced for personal/social and 
success/failure, as well as causal agency. Participants were assigned to either the 
free-appraisal or the induced-appraisal vignettes.  
 After reading each vignette, participants rated agency appraisals and emotions as 
in Study 1. They were then asked to estimate the percentage of the population of the same 
age and gender as themselves that was better than they were for each of 10 traits – 
intelligent, considerate, hard-working, interesting, dependable, confident, loyal, attractive, 
cooperative, and independent. The questionnaires were created in English first, translated 
into Japanese, and back-translated into English to make sure that English and Japanese 
versions had the same contents. 
Results and Discussion 
Correlations between Appraisal and Emotion Types 
 Correlations between agency appraisals and corresponding types of emotions 
were very similar to the ones we found in Study 1. In the success vignettes, the 
correlation for agency appraisals (self, other, situation) and their corresponding types of 
emotions were all significant, r = .51, p < .001; r = .36, p < .001; r = .29, p < .001, 
respectively. Likewise, all the correlations in the failure vignettes were significant, r 
= .68, p <.001; r = .33, p < .001; r = .51, p < .001, respectively.  
Free-Appraisal Vignettes 
 Agency appraisals. A mixed-design Culture x Gender x Appraisal (self, other 
person, situation) ANOVA was computed for each type of situation (i.e., personal success, 
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personal failure, social success, social failure). The means, standard deviations, ANOVA 
results, and effect sizes are shown in Table 2.4. The overall attribution patterns were very 
similar to those we observed in Study 1, and often stronger. For example, Americans 
attributed personal success to themselves more than did Japanese, t (32) = 3.11, p < .01, d 
= 1.07, whereas Japanese attributed success to the situation more than did Americans, t 
(32) = 3.11, p < .01, d = 1.07. In fact, the present study found that Japanese 
situation-agency appraisal in the personal success vignette was even greater than their 
self-agency appraisal, t (19) = 3.85, p = .001. Also, Americans attributed personal failure 
to others significantly more than did Japanese, t (32) = 2.42, p < .05, d = .80.  
 As in Study 1, there was no significant Culture x Appraisal interaction in the 
social success vignette. However, when the two cultures were analyzed separately, there 
were no significant differences in Americans’ appraisals of agency to self, others, or the 
situation, but the Japanese attributed their social success to situational factors 
significantly more than to themselves or other people, t (19) = 3.32, p < .01; t (19) = 2.64, 
p < .05, respectively. Americans attributed social failure to other people more than did 
Japanese, t (32) = 2.72, p < .05, d = .81, whereas Japanese attributed social failure to 
themselves more than did Americans, t (32) = 2.32, p < .05, d = .98. In short, Americans’ 
self-enhancing and Japanese’ self-effacing attribution tendencies were demonstrated even 
more clearly in Study 2 than in Study 1. 
 Agency-related emotions. The results of the mixed-design ANOVAs (Culture x 
Gender x Emotion) are shown in Table 2.5. Again, the findings were very similar to what 
we saw in Study 1. For example, in comparison to the Japanese, Americans reported 
significantly stronger self-agency emotions for the personal success vignette, t (32) = 
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2.30, p < .05, d = .84, and stronger other-agency emotions for the personal failure 
vignette, t (32) = 2.61, p < .05, d = .92. For these personal success and failure vignettes, 
Americans’ other-agency emotions were quite high, given the level of their attribution to 
others, replicating what we observed in Study 1. As found in Study 1, this cultural 
difference in other-agency emotions was primarily due to friendly feeling in the personal 
success vignette (Japan, M = .27, SD = 2.85; US, M = 5.79, SD = 1.97), t (32) = 3.74, p 
= .001, d = 1.26. Further analysis found that American’s friendly feeling in the personal 
success vignette was significantly correlated with their self-agency appraisal (r = .83, p 
< .001) but not with their other-agency appraisal (r = .30, ns). Among Japanese, friendly 
feeling was significantly correlated with their other-agency appraisal (r = .49, p < .05) but 
not with their self-agency appraisal (r = .09, ns). Thus, while Japanese feel friendly 
towards others when personal success was attributed to others, Americans feel friendly 
when they attribute it to themselves. However, no such cultural differences were found in 
the feeling of unfriendliness in the personal failure vignettes.  
 When imagining themselves in social successes, Americans reported the three 
types of emotions equally strongly, reflecting their equal attribution to the three possible 
agents. Also reflecting their agency appraisals, Japanese situation-agency emotions were 
significantly stronger than their self-agency emotions, t (19) = 6.13, p < .001, or their 
other-agency emotions, t (19) = 3.15, p < .01. Again, Japanese self-agency emotions were 
much weaker than we might expect from their attribution of success to themselves. When 
imagining social failures, Japanese reported stronger self-agency emotions than 
Americans, t (32) = 4.11, p < .001, d = 1.40, corresponding to their agency appraisals. 
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Overall, these emotion patterns reflect the culturally typical agency appraisals, and 
replicate the findings of Study 1. 
 Self-enhancement measure. The mean percentage of the ten trait items was 
computed for each participant. The score could vary from 0 to 100, smaller numbers 
indicating greater self-enhancement. Consistent with past literature, Americans’ 
self-enhancement (M = 21.63, SD = 11.40) was significantly greater than that of Japanese 
(M = 55.54, SD = 11 33), t (66) = 12.11, p < .001, d = 2.98.  
 More important, we found significant correlations between self-enhancement 
and agency appraisals (personal and social vignettes were collapsed in this analysis). The 
higher participants’ self-enhancement (i.e., lower percentage score), the more they 
attributed success to themselves (r = -.24, p < .05) and failure to others (r = -.40, p 
= .001). In contrast, the lower participants’ self-enhancement, the more they attributed 
success to the situation (r = .43, p < .001) and failure to themselves (r = .32, p < .01). 
Similar correlations were also found between self-enhancement and emotions. The higher 
the self-enhancement, the stronger the self-agency emotions in the success vignettes (r = 
-.36, p < .01) and the stronger the other-agency emotions in the failure vignettes (r = -.37, 
p < .01). In contrast, the lower the self-enhancement, the stronger the situation-agency 
emotions in the success vignettes (r = .38, p = .001) and the stronger the self-agency 
emotions in the failure vignettes (r = .26, p < .05). 
 Most important, when we controlled for self-enhancement by entering it as a 
covariate in Culture x Appraisal ANOVAs, the interaction terms were markedly reduced 
in the success vignettes, F (2,130) = 3.67, p < .05, ηp2 = .05 (in comparison to F (2,132) = 
12.13, p < .001, ηp2 = .16 without the covariate), and became non-significant in the failure 
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vignettes, F (2,130) = .25, ns., ηp2 = .00 (F (2,132) = 6.40, p < .01, ηp2 = .09 without 
covariate). Similar findings were obtained in Culture x Emotion ANOVAs. When the 
self-enhancement score was controlled for, the Culture x Emotion interaction became 
non-significant in the success conditions, F (2,130) = .90, ns., ηp2 = .01 (F (2,132) = 
17.52, p < .001, ηp2 = .21 without the covariate), and noticeably reduced in the failure 
conditions, F (2,130) = .3.31, p < .05, ηp2 = .05 (in comparison to F (2,132) = 7.87, p 
< .001, ηp2 = .11 without the covariate). These findings indicate that cultural differences 
in agency appraisal and the corresponding emotion were largely due to individuals’ 
self-enhancement tendencies. 
Induced Appraisal Vignettes 
 Agency appraisals. A mixed-design ANOVA (Culture x Gender x Appraisal) 
was computed for each of the 12 vignettes (i.e., personal/social, success/failure, 
self/other/situation causality information). The means and standard deviations are shown 
in Table 2.6, and the ANOVA results are shown in Table 2.7. In ten of the twelve 
vignettes Culture x Attribution interaction did not reach significance, indicating that 
given the same causal information, Japanese and American participants made the same 
agency appraisals. The two exceptions were the vignettes describing personal successes 
caused by oneself and by other people. Even when personal success was described as 
being caused by the self, Japanese continued to attribute it to the situation significantly 
more than did Americans, t (39) = 3.28, p < .01, d = .83. Also even when personal 
success was described as being caused by someone else, Americans continued to attribute 
it to themselves significantly more than did Japanese, t (35) = 3.28, p < .01, d = 1.19. 
However, in comparison to the free-appraisal vignette, the Culture x Appraisal 
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interactions in these self-agency and other-agency induced appraisal vignettes were 
significantly smaller, F(2,134) = 5.89, p<.01, ηp2=.08; F(2.126) = 3.11, p<.05, ηp2=.05, 
respectively. Thus, although some cultural differences still remained in the two personal 
success vignettes, the induced-attribution vignettes were mostly successful in eliminating 
cultural differences in appraisal.  
 Agency-related emotions. A mixed-design ANOVA (Culture x Gender x 
Emotion) was computed for each type of personal/social, success/failure vignette. The 
means and standard deviations are shown in Table 2.8, and the ANOVA results are 
shown in Table 2.9. In ten out of 12 vignettes, the Culture x Emotion interactions did not 
reach significance. Again, cultural differences remained in two of the personal success 
vignettes. In the other-agent appraisal induced vignette, Americans’ other-agency 
emotions were significantly weaker than those of the Japanese, t (35) = 3.86, p < .001, d 
= 1.36, and in the situation-agency appraisal induced vignette, Americans’ 
situation-agency emotions were significantly weaker than those of the Japanese, t (40) = 
2.26, p < .05, d = .69. Although significant, the Culture x Attribution interactions for 
these other-agency and situation-agency induced appraisal vignettes were significantly 
smaller than that of the free-appraisal vignette, F(2,132) = 4.82, p=.01, ηp2=.07; F(2.136) 
= 3.50, p<.05, ηp2=.05, respectively, suggesting that cultural differences in emotions 
greatly diminished or disappeared when appraisals were the same.  
General Discussion 
 The major contribution of the present research is that it demonstrated the 
universality and cultural specificity of appraisal theories of emotion. Particularly, the 
current findings are consistent with the universal contingency hypothesis, which predicts 
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that equivalent emotions in different cultures are characterized by similar appraisal 
patterns, and the dimensions that define appraisal patterns are culturally general 
(Ellsworth, 1994; Mesquita& Ellsworth, 2001). Indeed, our studies found that the 
emotions experienced by both Japanese and Americans in success and failure situations 
were distinguished by the dimension of agency. That is, in both cultures, appraisals of 
agency (self, other people, or situation) were significantly correlated with type of emotion 
(which we distinguished as self-, other-, or situation-agency emotions). In further support 
of the hypothesis, Japanese and Americans reported experiencing similar emotion when 
they were induced to make the same appraisal. 
 The present research also demonstrated culturally specific patterns of appraisal 
and emotion. Drawing on appraisal theories of emotion and past research on cultural 
differences in self-serving attributions, we hypothesized that Japanese and Americans 
would appraise the same situations differently on the dimension of causal agency and, as 
a consequence, experience different emotions. Consistent with the past literature, 
significant cultural differences in agency appraisals for successes and failures were 
observed: In comparison to the Japanese, Americans credited themselves for successes 
and blamed failures on external factors (other people and the situation), whereas Japanese 
attributed success to the situation and blamed themselves for failure. More important, the 
current research provided evidence that Americans and Japanese experience different 
emotions as a result of these different appraisals. That is, Americans experienced 
self-agency emotions such as pride when they succeeded but other-agency and 
situation-agency emotions such as anger and bad luck when they failed. By contrast, 
Japanese felt lucky when they succeeded but felt ashamed when they failed. 
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 Earlier, we argued that cultural differences in appraisals and the corresponding 
emotions stem from cultural differences in the motivation to maintain a positive view of 
the self. Accordingly, we found that the degree to which individuals view themselves 
positively was strongly correlated with self-serving agency appraisals and the 
corresponding emotions, and that the cultural differences in appraisal and emotion 
virtually disappeared once we statistically controlled for the self-enhancement.  
 While most of the findings matched our expectations, some were quite 
unexpected. For example, we found some discrepancies between appraisals and emotions. 
Americans felt fairly strong other-agency emotions, particularly friendly feeling, in the 
personal conditions, even though they did not attribute the outcome to other people. This 
tendency persisted in the personal success vignette condition of Study 2 even when we 
induced participants to make self and situational attributions. Study 2 also found that 
Japanese felt friendly when they attributed personal success to others as we expected, but 
Americans felt friendly when they attributed the success to themselves, but not to others. 
Thus, personal achievement may enhance Americans’ relationships with others, but 
receiving help from others may enhance Japanese relationships with others.  
 Another discrepancy between agency appraisal and emotion was that Japanese 
reported relatively little self-agency emotion when they attributed social success to 
themselves (Study 1 and free-attribution vignette in Study 2). The correlation between the 
self-attribution and self-caused emotion in the social success condition of Study 1 was 
significant for Americans (r = .38, p < .05) but not for Japanese (r = .21, ns). This 
correlation in Study 2 was significant for both Japanese and Americans, but it was 
weaker for Japanese (r = .34, p = .001) than for Americans (r = .55, p < .001). It may be 
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that Japanese are reluctant to feel good about themselves, particularly to feel proud or 
superior in social situations, because such personally focused positive feelings may 
disrupt their harmonious relationships with others (Uchida, Narasakkunkit, & Kitayama, 
2004). Thus, while feeling good about oneself may enhance Americans’ relationships 
with others, it may impair Japanese relationships with others. These speculations should 
be further investigated in future studies.  
 One of the limitations of the present studies is that they rely on self-report. It is 
possible that the Japanese’ humble self-presentation was simply a matter of impression 
management, thus, did not reflect their true feelings. This concern is not unique to our 
research, but is general in cross-cultural research on self-serving biases. However, some 
studies provide evidence that Japanese are not feigning modesty (Heine, Lehman, Markus, 
& Kitayama, 1999). For example, Japanese are just as self-critical when they fill out 
questionnaires in complete anonymity (Kitayama, 1999). Also, Japanese evaluate other 
people’s self-esteem as negatively as their own (Kitayama et al., 1997), suggesting that 
Japanese critical evaluation is not limited to themselves but is a general cultural 
perception. Therefore, it is reasonable to believe that Japanese participants in our studies 
were also reporting their genuine responses. 
 Another limitation is that the findings in the present research were based on 
retrospective and hypothetical situations, which may be quite different from how people 
perceive situations and experience emotions at the moment of actually experiencing 
success or failure. In fact, discrepancies between on-line and retrospective or hypothetical 
emotion reports have been found in past research (see Robinson & Clore, 2002 for a 
review). For example, men reported more intense male-stereotypic emotions (e.g., pride, 
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anger), and women reported more intense female-stereotypical emotions (e.g., guilt, 
sympathy) in retrospective and hypothetical conditions, but these gender differences were 
not observed when people described their actual current emotions (Robinson, Johnston, 
& Shields, 1998). Similarly, Asian Americans and Japanese showed fewer positive 
emotions than did European Americans in retrospective reports, but the cultural 
difference in reports on ongoing experience were found to be small (Scollon, Diener, 
Lucas, Oishi, & Biswas-Diener, 2001).  
 Robinson and Clore (2002) argue that such discrepancies occur because in 
retrospective or hypothetical conditions, individuals’ general beliefs about emotion (e.g., 
cultural beliefs, social norms, and stereotypes) play a significant role in filling in the 
details of their emotional experience. In this respect, it is important to understand 
cognitive appraisal not as a one-time event but rather as a process that evolves over time. 
Thus, in our future research we intend to examine online and retrospective reports of the 
same event to find out how cultural beliefs about attribution and emotion come into play 
in the evolving process of cognitive appraisal and corresponding emotions over a longer 







Correlation between agency appraisal and emotion in Study 1  
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Note. + p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, ***p < .001. Personal and social situations are collapsed. 





Agency appraisal means and ANOVA results in Study 1 
 
 Personal Success  Personal Failure1  Social Success  Social Failure 
 Japan US Japan US Japan US Japan US 
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Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01, ***p < .001. Within each column, means with different scripts (a, b, c,) are significantly different at p<.05. 
1 Gender main effect, F (1,57) = 5.82*, ηp2 = .09; Culture x Gender, F (1,57) = 5.01*, ηp2 = .08; and Gender x Appraisal, F (1,57) = 4.44*, ηp2 = 





Emotion means and ANOVA results in Study 1 
 
 Personal Success  Personal Failure  Social Success  Social Failure 
 Japan US Japan US Japan US Japan US 
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Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01, ***p < .001. Within each column, means with different scripts (a, b, c,) are significantly different at p<.05. 
In success situations, self-agency emotions are proud, confident, satisfied, and superior; other-agency emotions are friendly, obligated, and 
grateful; and situation-agency emotion is lucky. In failure situations, self-agency emotions are angry at self, regretful, ashamed, and self-critical; 
other-agency emotions are unfriendly, resentful, and angry; and situation-agency emotion is unlucky.  






Agency appraisal means and ANOVA results for the free-appraisal vignettes in Study 2 
 
 Personal Success1  Personal Failure2  Social Success  Social Failure3 
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Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01, ***p < .001. Within each column, means with different scripts (a, b, c,) are significantly different at p<.05. 
1 Culture x Gender x Appraisal was significant in the personal success free-appraisal vignette, F (2,60) = 3.32*, ηp2 = .10.  
2 Gender main effect, F (1,30) = 4.58*, ηp2 = .13, and Culture x Gender x Appraisal, F (2,60) = 3.59*, ηp2 = .11, were significant in the personal 
failure free-appraisal vignette.  





Emotion means and ANOVA results for the free-appraisal vignettes in Study 2 
 
 Personal Success1  Personal Failure  Social Success  Social Failure2 
 Japan US Japan US Japan US Japan US 
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Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01, ***p < .001. Within each column, means with different scripts (a, b, c,) are significantly different at p<.05. 
In success situations, self-agency emotions are proud, confident, satisfied, and superior; other-agency emotions are friendly, obligated, and 
grateful; and situation-agency emotion is lucky. In failure situations, self-agency emotions are angry at self, regretful, ashamed, and self-critical; 
other-agency emotions are unfriendly, resentful, and angry; and situation-agency emotion is unlucky.  
1 Gender main effect was significant in the personal success free-attribution vignette, F (2,60) = 4.34*, ηp2 = .13.  





Agency appraisal means for the induced-appraisal vignettes in Study 2 
 
  Personal Success  Personal Failure  Social Success  Social Failure 
Vignette type Agency Japan US Japan US  Japan US Japan US 
 appraisal M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD)  M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 



























































































































































Agency appraisal ANOVA results for the induced-appraisal vignettes in Study 2 
 
  Personal Successa  Personal Failureb  Social Successc  Social Failure 
Vignette type ANOVA F (df) ηp2  F (df) ηp2  F (df) ηp2  F (df) ηp2 
 Culture 3.00 (1,37) .09  
4.34* 
(1,36) .11  
.03  






(2,74) .64  
185.74*** 
(2,72) .84  
.99 
(2,72) .03  
19.54*** 
(2,74) .35 
 C x A 6.29** (2,74) .12  
2.30 
(2,72) .06  
.13 






(1,33) .02  
.62 
(1,34) .02  
1.59  




induced  Attribution 
3.67* 
(2,66) .10  
2.46 
(2,68) .07  
7.36*** 
(2,76) .16  
11.30*** 
(2,72) .24 
 C x A 11.05*** (2,66) .25  
.00 
(2,68) .00  
.37 






(1,38) .09  
.00 
(1,38) .00  
.86  






(2,76) .27  
18.50*** 
(2,76) .33  
32.60*** 
(2,68) .49  
2.89 
(2,70) .08 
 C x A 1.91 (2,76) .05  
1.64 
(2,76) .04  
1.79 
(2,68) .05  2.74 (2,70) .07 
Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01, ***p < .001 
a Gender x Appraisal was significant in the personal success self-agency induced vignette, F (2,74) = 3.32**, ηp2 = .12.  
b Culture x Gender was significant in the personal failure self-agency induced vignette, F (2,36) = 6.04*, ηp2 = .14. 





Emotion means for the induced-appraisal vignettes in Study 2 
 
  Personal Success  Personal Failure  Social Success  Social Failure 
  Japan US Japan US Japan US Japan US 
Vignette type Emotion M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 








































































































































































Note. In success situations, self-agency emotions are proud, confident, satisfied, and superior; other-agency emotions are friendly, obligated, and 
grateful; and situation-agency emotion is lucky. In failure situations, self-agency emotions are angry at self, regretful, ashamed, and self-critical; 





Emotion ANOVA results for the induced-appraisal vignettes in Study 2  
 
  Personal Success  Personal Failure  Social Successa  Social Failure  
Vignette type ANOVA F (df) ηp2  F (df) ηp2  F (df) ηp2  F (df) ηp2 
 Culture .49 (1,37) .01  
2.23 
(1,36) .07  
.00  






(2,74) .51  
38.64*** 
(2,72) .52  
.43 
(2,72) .01  
8.36*** 
(2,74) .18 
 C x E 2.78 (2,74) .07  
.64 
(2,72) .02  
1.39 






(1,33) .04  
.62 
(1,34) .01  
.45  




induced  Emotion 
.72 
(2,66) .02  
1.53 
(2,68) .04  
26.65*** 
(2,76) .41  
17.59*** 
(2,72) .33 
 C x E 4.71* (2,66) .13  
.05 
(2,68) .00  
2.86 






(1,38) .00  
.07 
(1,38) .00  
1.21  




ncy induced Emotion 
44.99*** 
(2,76) .55  
3.71** 
(2,76) .09  
16.84*** 
(2,68) .33  
10.97*** 
(2,70) .24 
 C x E 3.45* (2,76) .08  
.42 
(2,76) .01  
1.22 
(2,68) .04  
2.08 
(2,70) .06 
Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01, ***p < .001 
In success situations, self-agency emotions are proud, confident, satisfied, and superior; other-agency emotions are friendly, obligated, and 
grateful; and situation-agency emotion is lucky. In failure situations, self-agency emotions are angry at self, regretful, ashamed, and self-critical; 
other-agency emotions are unfriendly, resentful, and angry; and situation-agency emotion is unlucky.  
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Appendix: Vignettes in Study 2 
 
[Personal Success] 
In the past, I had always struggled with this particular subject (e.g., Math, Chemistry, 
English, or History). Whenever I took tests, I did not do very well. Last semester, I had to 
take a course in this particular subject to fulfill the requirements. As usual, I did not 
expect to do well. However, I did very well on the papers, quizzes, and exams in the 
course. Overall, I got 98 out of 100, and I ended up receiving an A for the course. 
 
Self-agency appraisal induced: This happened as a result of me actually understanding 
the content of the course very well. Because I was not confident in this subject, I worked 
very hard, always attended lectures, asked questions, and did the homework, all of which 
actually paid off. In fact, I wrote good papers and gave a good presentation. I guess I am 
much better at this subject than I previously thought. 
 
Other-agency appraisal induced: This happened because I got a lot of help from other 
people. The professor’s lecture was clear and easy to understand, and the GSI paid close 
attention to my performance, tried to understand my ideas, and gave me a lot of advice 
throughout the semester. Also, a friend of mine who took the course before helped me go 
over some of the materials before exams. 
 
Situation-agency appraisal induced: This happened because the course was not so 
difficult. Many of the other students in a class had never taken courses above 
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intermediate level, so I had an advantage over them. Also, my work load was not so 
heavy that semester, so I could spend more time on studying for the course. Also, many 
exam questions were from the parts I happened to have studied. 
 
[Personal Failure] 
In the past, I had been very good at this particular subject (e.g., Math, Chemistry, 
English, or History). Whenever I took tests, I did pretty well. Last semester, I had to take 
a course in this particular subject to fulfill the requirements. I expected to do well as 
usual. However, I did very poorly on the papers, quizzes, and exams in the course. 
Overall, I got 75 out of 100, and I ended up receiving a C for the course. 
 
Self-agency appraisal induced: This happened as a result of me not understanding the 
content of the course very well. Because I was overconfident in this subject, I did not 
work very hard, often skipped lectures, did not ask questions, and did not do the 
homework seriously, all of which actually contributed to my bad grade. In fact, I wrote 
sloppy papers, and my presentation wasn’t good either. I guess I am not as good at this 
subject as I previously thought. 
 
Other-agency appraisal induced: This happened because the course was poorly taught. 
The professor’s lecture was disorganized and hard to understand. Throughout the 
semester, the GSI did not care much about my performance, did not try to understand my 
ideas, and the comments I received did not make much sense and, as a result, not helpful 
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at all. Also, a friend of mine who took the course before told me to focus on certain parts, 
which turned out to be not important at all. 
 
Situation Attribution induced: This happened because the course was particularly 
difficult. Many of the other students in a class had taken advanced level courses before, 
so I was at a disadvantage compared to them. Also, my work load was extremely heavy 
that semester, so I could not spend enough time on studying for the course. Also, there 
were no questions on the exam from the sections I had studied most. 
 
[Social Success*] 
I had vaguely known this person but never really talked to him/her before. I thought 
he/she was very different from me in terms of personality and interests. I had also heard 
not very nice things about him/her. Last semester, I took the same class as he/she and was 
assigned to give a presentation together with him/her. I wished my partner was someone 
else. However, it turned out that we really got along well, successfully collaborated, and 
became good friends.  
 
Self-agency appraisal induced: This happened because of my effort to build a good 
relationship with him/her. Despite my initial impression of him/her, I put out a lot of 
effort to be open-minded and talked to him/her in a nice friendly way. I listened to his/her 
ideas about our project and respected those ideas. I also brought up many topics that were 





Other-agency appraisal induced: This happened because he/she turned out to be much 
nicer and more easy-going than I thought. Contrary to my initial impression of him/her, 
he/she talked to me in a nice friendly way. He/she listened to my ideas about our project 
carefully and respected my ideas. He/she also brought up many topics that were not 
related to our project so we could talk about many different things to get to know each 
other. 
 
Situation-agency appraisal induced: This happened by chance. We happened to be in the 
same class and happened to be assigned to work together. This naturally gave us an 
opportunity to spend more time together. We started talking about many different things 
that were not related to the project so we got to know each other well. We also found out 




I had vaguely known this person but never really talked to him/her before. I thought 
he/she and I might have a lot in common in terms of personality and interests. I had also 
heard good things about him/her. Last semester, I took the same class as he/she and was 
assigned to give a presentation together with him/her. I was glad that my partner was 
him/her. However, it turned out that we did not get along well at all, could not develop 




Self-agency appraisal induced: This happened because I did not make enough of an effort 
to develop a good relationship with him/her. Because I assumed that we were similar and 
compatible, I might have been insensitive to his/her feelings and spoken to him/her too 
bluntly. I did not listen to his/her ideas about our project carefully enough, and I was 
always critical. Also, I did not try to broaden the scope of our conversation to get to know 
him/her better.  
 
Other-agency appraisal induced: This happened because he/she turned out to be not at all 
nice or easy-going. Contrary to my initial impression of him/her, he/she talked to me in a 
cold and distant way. Not only did he/she not care about my ideas about the project but 
he/she was always critical. Also, he/she talked only about the project and did not try to 
broaden the scope of our conversation or try to get to know me better. 
 
Situation-agency appraisal induced: This happened by chance. We were happened to 
work together on the project, but the project was boring. This naturally made us take 
unpleasant attitudes toward each other. We just wanted to get it done as fast as possible, 
so we did not spend much time together. Also, we often got annoyed that our opinions 
often disagreed. As a result, we did not broaden the perspective of our conversation to get 
to know each other better. 
 






Cultural Narratives of Independence and Interdependence: 
An Analysis of Children’s Stories in the United States and Japan 
 
In the recent cultural psychological literature, the cultures of the United States and 
Japan are commonly characterized as independent (or individualistic) and interdependent 
(or collectivistic), respectively (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 1995). It has been 
argued that European American cultures are organized in terms of the view of the self as 
independent. Available practices and routines of daily life tend to be individualistic. In 
contrast, East Asian cultures are organized in terms of the view of the self as 
interdependent. Numerous practices in East Asian cultures tend to be rather collectivistic. 
As may be expected, Euro-Americans show a number of psychological responses that are 
in line with the independent view of the self. In contrast, Japanese show psychological 
responses that are in line with the interdependent view of the self (see e.g., Kitayama, 
Duffy, & Uchida, 2007, for a review). For example, whereas Euro-Americans tend to 
attend to a focal object rather than its context, Japanese tend to be more holistic in 
attention (e.g., Kitayama, Duffy, Kawamura, & Larsen, 2003; Masuda & Nisbett, 2001). 
Moreover, Euro-Americans tend to experience personal, rather than social, happiness, but 
Asians tend to experience social, rather than personal, happiness (Kitayama, Mesquita, & 
Karasawa, 2006). Also consistent is evidence that Euro-Americans are far more likely 
than Asians to prefer uniqueness to conventionality (Kim & Sherman., 2007). 
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One important issue that is often left unexplored in the cultural psychology 
literature concerns specific mechanisms by which the cultural shaping of psychological 
responses might take place. It would seem likely, however, that moral messages of both 
independence and interdependence are conveyed and inculcated into new members of the 
culture through stories specifically prepared for them, namely, children’s stories. 
Consistent with this proposal, many scholars have pointed out that children’s stories often 
convey strong moral messages (e.g., Vandenplas-Holper, 1990). For example, the story 
of the tortoise and the hare teaches children that continuous effort and hardworking is 
much more important than inherent ability.  
So far, a number of researchers have content-analyzed cultural artifacts such as 
advertisements in popular magazines for adults (Kim & Markus, 1999), persuasive 
messages (Han & Shavitt, 1994), and newspaper articles (Morris & Peng, 1994). 
Recently, Morling and Lamoreaux (2008) identified over 50 such studies that examined 
various types of cultural products from different cultures and conducted a meta-analysis 
to find out the extent to which independence and interdependence are emphasized in 
those cultural products. As predicted, their analysis revealed that cultural products from 
the West (mostly the U.S.) were significantly more independently oriented than those 
from East Asia (including Japan, Korea, and China) whereas cultural products from East 
Asia were significantly more interdependently oriented than those from the West. 
However, as shown by the list of studies Morling and Lamoreaux used in their analysis, 
very few studies have focused on children’s stories (except Tsai, Louie, Chen, & Uchida, 
2007 for recent studies looking at pictures in children’s stories for facial expressions). 
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This omission is glaring because children’s stories are likely to play an important role in 
cultural transmission.   
The Morling and Lamoreaux meta-analysis (2008) also found that the effect sizes 
they obtained from the studies on cultural products were significantly larger than the 
rather small effect sizes Oyserman, et al. (2002) obtained in their meta-analysis of 
self-report studies for independence-interdependence orientations, suggesting that such 
cultural orientations were more clearly observed in cultural products than in people’s 
minds. While the possible reasons for such a difference were further discussed by 
Morling and Lamoreaux (2008), one thing is clear – we cannot draw any conclusions 
based on the studies investigating either cultural environments or people’s psyches only. 
Particularly from the perspective that culture and psyche make each other up (Shweder, 
1989), it is crucial to investigate both sides of a coin – that is, investigating the extent to 
which cultural products emphasize different ideas, and the extent to which these ideas are 
distributed and shared by the people within a given cultural context.  
The purpose of the present work was therefore three-fold. We wanted to 
determine whether children’s stories in the United States would in fact emphasize 
independence and interdependence whereas children’s stories in Japan emphasize 
interdependence. Study 1 sought evidence for this predicted cultural variation in the 
contents of children’s stories in the United States and Japan. If found, such evidence 
would be consistent with the present proposal. However, this evidence would hardly be 
sufficient to fully sustain the proposal. It is also important to show that these kinds of 
story are, in fact, used in educating children. Study 2, therefore, tested the degree to 
which elementary schoolteachers would adopt different story contents as their education 
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materials. Furthermore, the content coding of children’s stories leaves open an important 
question of how widely story contents are distributed and shared by lay people in the 
respective cultural contexts. Study 3 was conducted to address this issue. 
 It has been proposed that cultures vary in the degree to which the self is 
conceptualized as independent from others or as interdependent with others (Kitayama et 
al., 2007; Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Although there are numerous values that are 
putatively universal across cultures (Schwartz, 1992; 1999), these values can be classified 
in terms of the degree to which they are congruous with independent-vs.-interdependent 
views of the self. Values that are grounded in the independent model of the self include 
self-enhancement, self-promotion, individual rights, freedom, uniqueness and creativity, 
and the pursuit of personal happiness, whereas those that are based on the interdependent 
view of the self include self-effacement, respect, altruism, collective duty, conservatism 
and national security, and conventionality and conformity (Triandis, 1995). The present 
research was designed to investigate the relative emphasis given to these types of values 
in children’s stories sampled from textbooks used in United States and Japan. We 
anticipated that independent or individualistic values would be highlighted more in 
American stories than in Japanese stories. In contrast, interdependent or collectivistic 
values were expected to be highlighted more in Japanese stories than in American stories.  
There are a few previous studies that compared children’s stories sampled in 
Euro-American vs. Asian cultural contexts that are relevant to the present analysis. In all 
these studies, the authors use their own coding schemes to content-analyze the stories. 
One problem for the present purposes is that each coding scheme is highly idiosyncratic 
and, even more problematic, none is designed with the distinction between independence 
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and interdependence in mind. Nevertheless, there are sporadic pieces of evidence that are 
consistent with the present analysis.  
 In one of the earliest studies, Zimet (1972) reported that American stories had 
especially low scores in putatively interdependent value categories such as traditionalism, 
conformity and compromise relative to other countries including Japan. Two additional 
studies make claims that are consistent with the current hypothesis. Lanham (1979) 
examined textbooks of ethics in Japan and the United States and observed that the 
American educational system strives for self-confidence while the Japanese educational 
system strives for self-discipline and perseverance. In a similar vein, Wang (1993) 
compared Taiwanese and American textbooks and observed that “society-centered or 
interpersonal qualities and behaviors” (e.g., appreciation of others, serving others, 
traditional Chinese virtues, honesty, and modesty) are much more frequently emphasized 
in Taiwanese textbooks, but “self-centered or personal qualities and behaviors” (e.g., 
personal feelings, individual accomplishments, independence, courage, determination, 
talent, confidence, imagination/creation, and humor) were more frequently highlighted in 
American textbooks. Unfortunately, in neither of the studies was any statistical analysis 
performed so it is not clear how reliable the findings might be (thus, these studies were 
not included in Morling & Lamoreaux, 2008). Although consistent with the present 
hypothesis, the evidence is far from conclusive. In Study 1, we therefore randomly 
sampled children’s stories from different cultural contexts and systematically 
content-coded them in terms of values related to both independence and interdependence. 




 Materials. Seventy-one Japanese stories were randomly sampled from first 
through sixth grade language arts (kokugo) textbooks used in Japanese public and private 
schools, which were approved by the Japanese Ministry of Science and Education. The 
three textbooks used in this study were the ones used in Kanagawa prefecture, published 
by three different companies: Tokyo-Syoseki, Mitsumura-Tosyo, and Gakkou-Tosyo. In 
the United States, seventy-two stories were randomly sampled from both language arts 
and reading textbooks. The three American textbooks used in this study were Harcourt 
Language, Houghton Mifflin English, and Signatures. These textbooks were 
recommended to school districts nationally as conforming to the educational program of 
the state of Texas. Due to the large number of school districts and their size, Texas 
dominates the United States textbook market and sets educational trends in the country 
(Athans, 1998). Moreover, these textbooks were ranked at the top for the best selling 
textbooks in the United States (“Harcourt Tops,” 1999). In both countries, we identified 
fiction only and then randomly sampled eight stories from each grade level (an exception 
in Japanese sixth-grade books, which contained only seven fiction pieces).  
Coding. Guided by the theoretical and empirical work on individualistic and 
collectivistic orientations (e.g., Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 1995), we selected 
50 pertinent values from Schwartz’s Value Survey (1992) and Kilby’s Omnibus Values 
Questionnaire (1993). Each story was rated for the 50 values on a scale of zero to three (0 
= not present, 1 = a little, 2 = moderate, 3 = strong). In some cases in which the values 
were present but used in a negative connotation, the values were rated using negative 
scores (-1 = A little negative, -2 = moderately negative, -3 = strongly negative). To 
observe general tendencies in the types of values embedded in the sample stories, these 
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50 values were grouped into nine larger categories (Table 3.1) -- five categories consisted 
of independent values (i.e., self-definition, stimulation, hedonism, achievement, and 
power), and four categories consisted of interdependent values (i.e., conformity, tradition, 
benevolence, and group harmony). All the sample stories were coded by a bilingual. 
Another bilingual who was blind to the hypothesis coded sixteen randomly selected 
stories (eight from each country). Cronbach’s alpha computed for the each of 50 discrete 
values was greater than .7, except in one case (the sense of humor) where the alpha was 
less than .7 (.63). This item was thus dropped.  
Results and Discussion  
 Although the fiction stories identified in the present work were diverse and each 
was unique in a variety of different ways, it was also easy to recognize overarching 
thematic homogeneity within in each country. It was quite common in American stories 
to find a protagonist who bravely confronts a difficulty and achieves a goal by his or her 
strong will or unique ideas. In particular, a protagonist is often put in a situation where he 
/she has no help from others, and thus must overcome the difficulty alone. By 
successfully achieving his/her goal, a protagonist discovers his/her own unique ability or 
gains confidence and great satisfaction. 
 A common plot of Japanese stories was quite different. Quite a few Japanese 
stories involve an initially lonely protagonist who became a friend with someone who 
understands his/her feelings very well, shows great concern for him/her, and helps or 
supports him/her without being asked (sometimes by self-sacrifice). Sometimes they 
were separated from each other for some reason (e.g., death), but the appreciation of such 
a great friendship and warm feelings of togetherness remain deeply in the protagonist’s 
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heart. In short, American stories teach children to be a strong, distinctive individual who 
is capable of achieving what he or she really wants. In contrast, Japanese stories teach 
children to be a kind, considerate, and altruistic member of the group and to recognize the 
importance of friendships.  
 These general observations were clearly borne out in our more systematic value 
coding. Table 3.1 shows the mean value scores computed across all the stories in each 
country. We had five overarching value domains that pertained to independence -- 
self-direction, stimulation, hedonism, achievement, and power. The value scores 
subsumed each domain were averaged and compared between two cultures. In four 
domains, the overall means were significantly greater for American stories than for the 
Japanese stories; self-direction (Ms = 1.14 vs. .40), t (127.99) = 8.11, p < .001, d = 1.38; 
stimulation (Ms = 1.28 vs. .80), t (122.42) = 3.73, p < .001, d = .61; achievement (Ms = 
1.26 vs. .39), t (132.39) = 8.35, p < .001, d = 1.40; and power(Ms = .56 vs. .06), t 
(114.10) = 7.14, p < .001, d = 1.20. Only the domain of hedonism did not reach the 
significance (Ms = 1.13 vs. .92), t (141) = 1.53, ns. We also had four overarching value 
domains that pertained to interdependence -- conformity, tradition, benevolence, and 
group harmony. In all of these domains, the overall means were significantly greater for 
Japanese stories than for the American stories; conformity (Ms = .65 vs. .30), t (105.07) = 
4.43, p < .001, d = .74; tradition (Ms = .62 vs. .10), t (102.36) = 6.24, p < .001, d = 1.05; 
benevolence (Ms = 1.18 vs. .39), t (114.63) = 8.26, p < .001, d = 1.38; and group 
harmony (Ms = 1.10 vs. .36), t (109.87) = 8.61, p < .001, d = 1.44. 
 When we examined these cultural differences more closely for the 49 discrete 
values, significant cultural differences were found for 41 of the 50 values, all in the 
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predicted direction (see Table 3.1). The largest cultural difference was found for 
sympathy (Japan>US), followed by success (US>Japan), acceptance of one’s portion in 
life (Japan>US), and self-respect (US>Japan). American stories particularly emphasized 
ambition, varied life, being influential, choosing own goals, and enjoyment whereas 
Japanese stories particularly emphasized sympathy, friendship and affection, helpfulness, 
pleasure in making others happy, and sense of belonging. 
Overall, Study 1 provided a striking confirmation of our prediction. American 
stories had significantly higher ratings for most of the independent values than did 
Japanese stories whereas Japanese stories had significantly higher ratings for most of the 
interdependent values than did American stories. As indicated by the large effect sizes, 
the observed cultural differences were robust.  
Study 2: Teachers’ Preference towards Independent and Interdependent Stories 
 Although Study 1 provided clear evidence that American stories highlight 
independent themes such as self-direction and achievement whereas Japanese stories 
highlight interdependent themes such as conformity and group harmony, an important 
question is whether the stories that are culturally appropriate are in fact be adopted in 
elementary education. This question is important because the stories children read depend 
very much on the adults who select stories for children. Furthermore, past research 
suggests that teachers’ personal beliefs and ideologies affect their classroom practices 
and decision-making (see Fang, 1996 for a review) and sometimes outweigh the 
pedagogical ideologies of the official curriculum (Shkedi & Nisan, 2006). Therefore, 
Study 2 was conducted to investigate schoolteachers’ preference for stories with different 
value emphases. We predicted that American teachers would prefer stories with 
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independent themes whereas Japanese teachers would prefer stories with interdependent 
themes.  
Method 
 Participants. We contacted elementary schoolteachers who were employed 
full-time at public elementary schools through personal networks and emails. The 
questionnaire was then mailed to 39 Japanese and 36 American teachers who agreed to 
participate. Twenty seven Japanese (25 females and 2 males; all Japanese born in Japan) 
and 27 American teachers (24 females and 3 males; 22 Caucasian, 3 African American, 1 
Arabic American, and 1 Asian American) returned the questionnaire. Japanese 
respondents resided in 8 different prefectures in Japan, and American teachers resided in 
10 different states over the continental US. No cultural differences were found in the 
mean age, t (52) = .32, ns (Japan, M = 41.69, SD = 9.02; US, M = 42.69, SD = 12.91) nor 
in the length of teaching experience, t (52) = .71, ns (Japan, M = 16.77 years, SD = 9.95; 
US, M = 14.69 years, SD = 11.29).  
 Sample stories. Six American and six Japanese stories were selected from the 3rd 
and 4th graders’ stories we used in Study 1. Three stories were the ones that had the 
highest independent value scores in comparison to the interdependent value scores, and 
the other three were the ones with the highest interdependent value scores in comparison 
to the independent value scores. The average independent and interdependent value 
scores of three independent American stories were 37.33 and 6.67, and those of the three 
interdependent American stories were 15.33 and 26.33, respectively. The average 
independent and interdependent value scores of three independent Japanese stories were 
20.00 and 5.33, and those of the three interdependent Japanese stories were 3.67 and 
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33.67, respectively. Black and white copies of these stories were enclosed in the mailed 
survey package. Japanese and American respondents read the stories of their own 
countries, thus the respondents’ ratings were compared within each culture.  
 Survey questionnaire. In a mail survey, respondents were first asked to read all 
six stories in a random order. They were then asked to rate each story on a scale of 1 (not 
very suitable) to 5 (very suitable) based on their judgment of how suitable the story 
would be for teaching language arts or reading for 3rd and 4th graders. They were also 
asked to choose the story they considered to be the best and to briefly describe their 
reasons for choosing it. Respondents then provided their demographic information 
including age, gender, ethnicity, and teaching experience.  
Results and Discussion  
 Teachers’ story preference. For each respondent mean preference scores were 
computed for the independent stories and the interdependent stories separately. Overall, 
Japanese showed a significantly higher preferences for the interdependent stories than for 
the independent stories (Ms = 3.73 vs. 3.36), t (26) = 2.13, p < .05. Furthermore, 18 out of 
27 respondents ranked an interdependent story as the best story although this was 
marginally significant, x2 = 3.00, p < .10. In contrast, American teachers showed no 
preference for either type of stories. Overall, the mean preference score for the 
independent stories was no different from the one for the interdependent stories (Ms =  
3.74 vs. 3.75), t < 1. Moreover, 13 respondents nominated an independent story as the 
best, with the remaining 14 nominating an interdependent story as the best. 
 Respondents’ selection criteria. We content-analyzed reasons respondents listed 
in choosing their best stories. Seventeen categories were created (see Table 3.2), and one 
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bilingual coded each respondent’s list of reasons for each of 17 categories as either 
present or absent. Another bilingual coded the lists created by of 24 respondents (12 
Japanese and 12 Americans). The percent agreement between the two coders was quite 
high (92%). 
 The number of Japanese respondents’ reasons (M = 3.00, SD = 1.54) did not 
differ from that of American respondents (M = 3.15, SD = 1.79), t (52) = .33, ns. As 
shown in Table 3.2, Japanese and American teachers shared some common reasons such 
as good/important values, provoking children’s interests, and appropriate difficulty level, 
but they also listed very different reasons as well. While Japanese respondents’ reasons 
focused on the feelings or general atmosphere stories convey (e.g., good descriptions of 
feelings and situations, heart-warming, fun, and exciting plots), American respondents 
typically focused on the elements that concerned children’s language improvement (e.g., 
vocabulary, reading comprehension, and writing skills).  
 It is possible that American teachers focus on the benefit of language 
improvement because they have greater responsibility in selecting the teaching materials 
than do Japanese teachers. In fact, American textbooks contain much more material than 
can possibly be taught within an academic year, whereas Japanese textbooks contain just 
enough materials to be covered. Possibly for this reason, American respondents did not 
evaluate the stories based on the values or themes of the stories as much as Japanese 
teachers did, which might have resulted in American respondents’ equal preference 
towards independent and interdependent stories.  
 Another possibility is that because of multicultural emphasis on American 
schools, American teachers are trained to be culturally sensitive, thus, consider both 
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independent and interdependent values to be important. Indeed, Schwartz (1999) found in 
his “smallest space analysis” of the value survey that in comparison to American and 
Japanese student samples, American and Japanese teacher samples were located much 
more closely on the bipolar axis of mastery (representing independence) and harmony 
(representing interdependence). Thus, in comparison to lay people, teachers may be less 
biased towards particular cultural values, and this may be especially true for American 
teachers who must be sensitive to their students’ various cultural backgrounds.  
Study 3: Cross-cultural Comparison of Spontaneously Created Stories 
 If children’s stories play a major role in transmitting cultural values to new 
members of a given society, the pertinent cultural values should be quite widely shared 
and actively reproduced by lay adult members who grew up with the stories of their 
culture. Thus, the purpose of Study 3 was to investigate how widely story contents are 
shared by lay people in the respective cultural contexts. To do this, we gave American 
and Japanese participants the first few sentences of a children’s story and asked them to 
complete it, predicting that their stories would unfold in a similar manner within each 
culture but differently across cultures.  
 The present study is not the first to examine cultural differences in 
spontaneously created stories. Domino and Hannah (1987) factor analyzed narrative 
stories Chinese and American children created from the same story beginnings. They 
identified dimensions that were common across cultures but differ in the extent to which 
they were emphasized in Chinese and American children’s stories. For example, stories 
created by Chinese children showed greater social orientation and greater concern with 
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authority than those created by their American counterparts (see also Wang & Leichtman, 
2000 for similar findings).   
 While the findings from the study by Domino and Hannah (1987) suggest that 
cultural differences in narratives emerge at an early age, the distinction between 
independence and interdependence was not clearly made. Also, their analyses do not tell 
us what the stories created by those children were actually like and what their 
protagonists actually thought, felt, or did. In the present study, therefore, we tried to 
capture the general picture of stories in a more tangible manner by identifying the 
behaviors or incidents that commonly appeared in the stories written by Japanese and 
Americans.  
Method 
 Participants. Fifty-eight undergraduate students (26 males, 32 females) at 
Kanazawa University in Japan and 50 undergraduate students (27 males, 23 females) at 
the University of Michigan participated in the study. Japanese participants were recruited 
from a voluntary subject pool (i.e., students voluntarily signed up to participate in 
psychological studies), and they received a book coupon upon completion of the study. 
American participants were recruited from introductory psychology classes, and they 
voluntarily participated in the study at the end of the class. They received no 
compensation. The ethnic composition for American participants was 35 Caucasian, six 
African American, six Asian American, and three mixed ethnicity, all born and raised in 
the United States. The mean age of the participants was 18.52 (SD = .86) for Japanese 
and 18.76 (SD = 1.29) for Americans, t (106) = 1.17, ns. 
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 Procedure. The study was conducted in groups of 10 to 25 people. Participants 
were first provided an informed consent explaining that the study was to examine 
people’s general thought tendencies through children’s stories they generate. They were 
then given a story beginning and told to continue and complete the story in 15 minutes. 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of three story beginnings. These story 
beginnings were originally written in English, translated into Japanese, and back 
translated into English to make sure that both versions were equivalent in their contents. 
The characters’ names were replaced with Japanese names in Japanese versions. Also, 
because people’s expectation for boys’ and girls’ behaviors might differ, a half of the 
story beginnings had male names but the rest had female names. Following are the 
English versions with male names.  
[Bus trip story] Ron went to a school trip with his classmates. Because everyone 
has been looking forward to this bus trip very much, they got very excited when 
the driver announced, “we are arriving soon.” But, actually, Ron has been 
gradually feeling sick on the bus. 
 
[Piano story] Ben has been practicing piano since he was little, so he is very 
good at it. One day, his homeroom teacher announced at the class, “There will 
be a chorus competition among classrooms, and we need one person who can 
accompany us on the piano. Would any of you like to do it?”  
 
[Softball story] Thomas is a member of softball team in his town. But because he 
is not very good at fielding, he rarely gets a chance to play in a game. One day, 
Jack, who is the best fielder in the team, forgot his glove at a game with 
neighboring town. Thomas thought that he might get a chance to play in the 
game. 
 
After participants completed the story, they answered demographic questions including 
gender, age, ethnicity, and the places they were born and raised.  
 Content analysis coding scheme. In order to capture a general picture of what the 
stories were like, incidents or behaviors that appeared in more than two stories were 
 
 104
identified and used as coding items. Then, items were categorized as independence, 
interdependence or neutral (see Table 3.3). Each story was coded by one bilingual for the 
presence or absence of those features. Another bilingual, who was fluent in both Japanese 
and English and blind to the purpose of the study or item categories (i.e., independence, 
interdependence, neutral), coded 18 stories (i.e., three stories in each story topic from two 
cultures). The percent agreement between the two coders was very high (97%).  
 In the bus trip stories, 14 features that appeared in more than two stories were 
identified and used as coding items. Among these, four were categorized as independence, 
eight were categorized as interdependence, and the remaining two were categorized as 
neutral (see Table 3.3). Analyzing the causality of sickness was included in the 
independence because it was considered as the effort to increase the knowledge about 
one’s condition. Also, telling others about feeling sick was categorized as independent 
because it is considered as an assertive action to express one’s need. Tolerating sickness 
and pretending to be ok were included in the interdependence because they involved the 
concern for others. 
 In the piano stories, 18 features that appeared in more than two stories were 
identified, of which seven were categorized as independence, eight were categorized as 
interdependence, and three were categorized as neutral (see Table 3.3). Negative feeling 
towards others and negative feeling from others were included in the neutral category 
because although these features involve other people, they are not exactly “ideal” 
interdependent values. 
 In the softball stories, 17 common features were identified, of which five were 
categorized as independence, seven were categorized as interdependence, and the 
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remaining five were categorized as neutral (see Table 3.3). Worrying about failure was 
included in the interdependence because it was strongly related to the concern for 
consequential team loss rather than for the damage to self-esteem. 
Results and Discussion 
 The number of the items that appeared in stories was significantly larger for the 
stories created by Japanese participants (M = 5.41, SD = .1.90) than those created by 
American participants (M = 3.60, SD = 1.63), t (106) = 5.28, p < .001, indicating that 
Japanese stories shared many more common features than did American stories, and that 
each of American story had many more unique and distinct features that were not shared 
among other stories than did Japanese stories. This resulted in having more 
interdependent items than independent items for all three types of stories. The frequency 
for each item was tested by chi-squares between the cultures (Table 3.3). 
 Bus trip stories. Overall, the stories created by Japanese participants emphasized 
sympathy and concern for others. For example, Japanese protagonists tolerated sickness 
because they did not want to spoil others’ enjoyment. But their friends recognized their 
sickness and comforted them in various ways. In contrast, American stories emphasized 
one’s control of the situation. Quite a few protagonists of the American stories tried to 
improve the situation by asking others for help, doing something to feel better, or 
analyzing the causality of the sickness. These observations are supported by the coding 
analyses we conducted. 
 Among the four independent items, only analyzing the causality found a 
significant cultural difference. This item appeared more often in the American stories 
then in the Japanese stories. The cultural differences were more prominent in the 
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interdependent items. Six out of eight items appeared significantly more often in the 
Japanese stories than in the American stories. In many more Japanese stories than in 
American stories, protagonists received care from others, and in turn, showed great 
appreciation for those who worried or helped them. It should also be noted that among 16 
Japanese stories in which protagonists were worried or helped by others, 15 of these 
“others” were peers (10 stories) or both peers and a teacher (5 stories). In contrast, only 
one American story had a peer who worried about or helped the protagonists, which was 
significantly less than the Japanese counterparts, x2(1) = 6.94, p < .01. The rest of two 
American stories had a teacher (1 story) and a doctor (1 story) who worried and helped 
the protagonists. Thus, peers played much more salient roles in Japanese stories than in 
American stories.  
 Japanese protagonists not only received care from others but also paid greater 
attention towards others. Japanese protagonists were greatly concerned about others (e.g., 
not wanting to spoil others’ fun or being afraid of receiving negative reactions from 
others) and thus tolerated sickness and hid their sickness from others more frequently 
than American protagonists.  
 Piano stories. Japanese and American participants also generated very different 
piano stories. In the stories Americans created, protagonists’ brilliant performance 
brought the first prize to the class. Even though the event was a chorus competition 
among classrooms, the stories Americans created were often about a very talented “solo 
pianist.” In contrast, in the stories Japanese created, protagonists were often nominated 
by their peers, and after hard group practice, all class members shared the feeling of 
togetherness and accomplishment.  
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 As briefly described above, American piano stories emphasized individuals’ 
talent and personal success whereas Japanese piano stories emphasized collaboration and 
group achievement. These cultural differences were also apparent in the coding analysis. 
Three independence items appeared significantly more often in the stories Americans 
created than those Japanese created. For example, protagonists in American stories were 
eager to show off their talents and nominated themselves for the position. When the class 
won the first prize, the success was attributed to the pianist (i.e., individual success as a 
pianist). In fact, in two American stories, protagonists received a special, individual 
award just for their piano performance. 
 In contrast, six interdependent items appeared more frequently in the Japanese 
stories than in American stories. The protagonists in the Japanese stories hesitated to 
nominate themselves, but obtained the position by peers’ nomination and approval much 
more often than those in the American stories. Also, they practiced with classmates (i.e., 
group practice) and experienced the feeling of togetherness and shared pleasure much 
more often than American protagonists.  
 Softball stories. Remarkable cultural differences were also observed in the 
softball stories. The stories created by Japanese participants emphasized group benefits. 
They also highlighted self-sacrifice. Moreover, Japanese stories emphasized hard work 
after a failure experience. These features were almost absent in the stories created by 
American participants. 
 While none of the independent items showed any significant cultural differences, 
five interdependent items found significant US-Japan differences. In many more Japanese 
stories than in American stories, protagonists lent their gloves to the teammate who 
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forgot his/her glove in order for the team to win (i.e., thinking about group benefit). 
When the Japanese protagonists had a chance to play in the game, they were worried 
about failure, which would result in the team loss.  
 Another noticeable cultural difference was observed in the items of increased or 
decreased motivation. Japanese stories were more likely than American stories to feature 
highly motivated protagonists. Interestingly, the increase in motivation occurred not only 
when Japanese protagonists played and performed well in the game (3 stories), but also 
when their performance was not satisfactory (2 stories) and when they did not get a 
chance to play in the game at all (6 stories). In contrast, incidents in which motivation 
decreased appeared only in the American stories, and this occurred when protagonists 
were told to lend their glove to the teammate. This made the protagonists so angry that 
they stormed off crying or quit softball all together, shifting their interests to something 
else. Although these two items were not categorized as independent or interdependent, 
the findings are consistent with past cross-cultural research on motivation: North 
Americans persist on the task after success but not after failure whereas Asians persist on 
the task to the same degree or even more after failure than success (Heine, Kitayama, 
Lehman, et al., 1999; Oishi & Diener, 2003).  
 To summarize, the stories created by Japanese on each of the three themes (i.e., 
baseball, piano, and softball) clearly emphasized interdependent themes such as 
sympathy, friendship, group success, and sense of belonging. Also, in these stories, other 
people, particularly peers, played very important roles. In contrast, the stories created by 
Americans on the same themes highlighted many independent themes such as personal 
achievement, control over situations, and self-confidence. Moreover, they did not involve 
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others as often. The culturally distinct themes observed here are analogous to the themes 
we found in Japanese and American textbook stories in Study 1.  
General Discussion 
 The present research hypothesized that children’s stories play an important role 
in inculcating independent and interdependent values into new cultural members of 
American and Japanese cultural contexts respectively. This hypothesis was largely 
supported by the findings from the present studies. First, Study 1 found that American 
stories for children highlighted the themes of independence significantly more than did 
Japanese stories whereas Japanese stories emphasized the themes of interdependence 
significantly more than did American stories. Second, Study 2 showed that elementary 
schoolteachers, at least in Japan, prefer the stories with culturally pertinent themes as 
their education materials. Moreover, Study 3 demonstrated that independent and 
interdependent story themes are also strongly emphasized in the stories spontaneously 
created by American and Japanese college students, respectively. Altogether, these 
findings suggest that children’s stories are rich in culturally pertinent themes, which are 
sometimes selectively delivered by educators, and deeply insinuated into lay people’s 
minds.  
The current research also implies that internalization and reproduction of cultural 
meanings are often implicit. First, cultural values are transmitted to the younger 
generation implicitly. That is, children’s stories usually do not tell explicitly what values 
are important, but such messages are transmitted to their readers through various 
examples for what individuals should consider and how they should act in certain 
situations. Thus, even though children are not aware that they are exposed to culturally 
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pertinent values, they adopt those values through the exposure to numerous examples. 
Indeed, Hoffman (1983) suggests that children internalize initially external values more 
effectively when they are introduced with low saliency because children forget their 
sources and experience them as their own.  
Second, people may be quite unaware of their own cultural values, thus, often fail 
to report them in an explicit manner. In fact, past studies that used self-report measures to 
compare people’s cultural orientations found surprisingly weak differences across 
cultures (Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 2002). However, we found evidence that 
individuals hold strong cultural values that were manifested in the stories people 
spontaneously generated. Thus, without one’s awareness or intention, implicitly 
internalized values exert their power in regulating their natural course of thoughts and 
behaviors.  
 Third, cultural values can be reproduced without individuals’ intention. It has 
recently been suggested that cultural differences may exist only among cultural elites 
(e.g., writers, journalists, copywriters) who produce a variety of cultural artifacts 
(Morling and Lamoreaux, 2008), and such cultural artifacts are professionally tailored in 
a way to appeal to their audience and, at the same time, shape and bolster people’s 
cultural orientation. However, our study suggests that robust cultural orientations toward 
independence or interdependence are not unique to stories written by professional writers 
but also evident in stories lay people spontaneously create without any intention to 
disseminate their cultural values. Thus, cultural reproduction is not dependent solely 
upon the work of cultural elites. Culture is constantly reproduced by lay people’s 
everyday discourses.  
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Although we believe the present studies to be quite successful in demonstrating 
the important role children’s stories play in representing and reproducing cultures of 
independence and interdependence, we also recognize some limitations in our studies. 
First of all, Study 1 examined the stories sampled from language arts textbooks because 
they are read by a wide population. However, we are aware that children also read story 
books outside their schools, which might even exceed in number the stories read in 
school. Thus, we should not assume that textbook stories are representation of those 
children are exposed to, and in future research, we should also examine other stories 
commonly read, such as those with the highest checking-out rate in libraries or best 
selling books. Similarly, we are also aware that other adults, such as parents, must play 
an important role in selecting books for children. Thus, future research should also 
investigate what types of stories parents prefer and what criteria they use when choosing 
stories for their children.  
 We must also note that the method of Study 2 was weak. We asked our 
respondents to read only six stories, thus one or two “good stories” could have 
significantly affected the results. Our data on teachers’ reasons for their selection suggest 
that besides the independent or interdependent values, there were other elements that 
made some stories more (or less) attractive than the rest. In fact, our respondents’ ratings 
varied to quite a large extent among the three independent or interdependent stories. A 
future study should therefore include a larger number of stories or use the same stories 
that are carefully translated into both languages. By having Americans and Japanese 
teachers read the same set of stories, we should be able to compare the differences in 
teachers’ preference cross-culturally in more accurate manner.  
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Lastly, we proposed that children’s stories play important role in shaping 
children’s values. The present research allows us to make inference about the connection 
between children’s stories and people’s cultural orientation; however, it does not clearly 
demonstrate the causal link between them. Empirically testing such a link will be 
extremely difficult as it may take many stories over many years for such an effect to take 
place. However, it may be still possible to test short-term effects of stories by using a 
priming method. For example, after reading several stories with independence or 
interdependence emphases, people’s cultural orientations may shift in the corresponding 
directions.  
 While priming methods may be useful in demonstrating the causal link between 
cultural environment and people’s mind, they would not answer the more important 
question: why independence is valued and reproduced in American cultural contexts and 
why interdependence is valued and reproduced in Japanese cultural contexts. In order to 
answer this question, we need to explore the historical origins of independence and 
interdependence. For example, population density, wealth, pathogen prevalence, social 
mobility, mode of subsistence (e.g., herding vs. agricultural), and history of voluntary 
settlement in the frontier are suggested to be strongly connected to the cultural orientation 
of independence and interdependence (Triandis, 1995; Fincher, Thornhill, Murray, and 
Schaller, 2008; Berry, 1967, 1979; Uskul, kitayama, & Nisbett, in press; Oishi, Lun, & 
Sherman, 2008; Kitayama, Ishii, Imada, Takemura, & Ramaswamy, 2006). Exploring 
factors is an important direction to pursue because it not only takes cultural psychological 
investigations beyond cultural comparisons but also helps up understand the functional 
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roles independence and interdependence play from the perspective of culture as an 




Value rating scores and statistical results for Japanese and American textbook stories 
 
  Japan  US  t Cohen’s 
  M SD  M SD  (df) d 
Independent Values        
Self-direction         
 Freedom .63 .90  1.13 1.21  2.76** (131.05) .47 
 Creativity .48 .86  1.19 1.26  3.97*** (125.31) .66 
 Self-reliance .30 .74  1.15 1.25  4.98*** (115.91) .83 
 Choosing own goals .37 .85  1.46 1.20  
6.30*** 
(128.07) 1.05 
 Curiosity .79 1.12  1.21 1.30  2.07* (138.53) .35 
 Self-respect .21 .56  1.31 1.24  6.82*** (98.94) 1.14 
 Self-development .41 .89  1.25 1.21  4.75*** (130.42) .79 
 Control  .06 .33  .40 .93  2.98** (89.19) .49 
Stimulation         
 Exciting life .65 .94  1.00 1.29  1.87 (130.08) .31 
 Varied life .94 .75  1.57 1.03  4.14*** (130.00) .70 
Hedonism         
 Pleasure .76 .92  .85 1.15  .50 (135.29) .09 
 Enjoyment 1.08 .10  1.42 1.17  1.83 (138.02) .41 
Achievement         
 Ambition .42 1.05  1.71 1.31  6.49*** (135.62) 1.09 
 Being influential .70 .84  1.50 1.14  4.77*** (130.27) .80 
 Competence .42 .87  1.42 1.18  5.72*** (130.60) .96 
 Success .15 .67  1.38 1.27  7.19*** (107.78) 1.21 
 Intellectual ability .46 1.09  .89 1.23  2.18* (139.55) .37 
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 Courage and bravery .48 .95  1.31 1.23  
4.50*** 
(133.65) .76 
 Competition .08 .63  .64 1.09  3.73*** (113.53) .63 
Power         
 Social Power .11 .87  .65 1.15  4.49*** (132.10) .53 
 Wealth .07 .80  .39 .88  2.27* (140.02) .38 
 Leadership .18 .62  .31 .78  1.04 (134.61) .18 
 Public image .10 .51  .75 1.14  4.43*** (98.98) .74 
 Social recognition .10 .38  .94 1.27  .42*** (84.11) .90 
 Aggressiveness .01 .67  .31 .83  2.31* (135.18) .40 
 
Interdependent Values        
Conformity         
 Obedience .65 .93  .24 .68  3.02** (128.50) .50 
 Self-discipline .41 .89  .31 .80  .73 (141.00) .12 
 Politeness .54 .94  .26 .61  2.05* (119.36) .35 
 Respectfulness .94 1.18  .65 .89  1.66 (130.12) .28 
 Self-sacrifice .70 1.09  .13 .50  4.08*** (98.21) .67 
 Adjustment  .63 1.12  .21 .58  2.84** (104.46) .57 
Tradition         
 Respect for tradition .32 .81  .22 .59  
.86 
(141.00) .14 
 Religiousness .13 .51  .10 .38  .40 (141.00) .07 
 Accepting one’s portion in life 1.27 1.35  .08 .55  
6.84*** 
(92.32) 1.15 
 Modesty .90 1.16  .15 .66  4.73*** (111.08) .79 
 Moderation .48 .97  -.04 .35  4.26*** (88.09) .71 
 




 Helpfulness 1.58 1.27  .82 1.12  3.78*** (138.17) .63 
 Responsibleness .80 1.12  .29 .78  3.17** (124.79) .53 
 Forgiveness .56 1.02  .15 .52  3.01** (103.69) .51 
 Honesty .49 1.01  .15 .52  2.52* (104.40) .42 
 Loyalty 1.25 1.35  .38 .85  4.66*** (117.44) .77 
 Sympathy 2.03 1.24  .51 .84  8.53*** (122.70) 1.43 
 Pleasure in making others happy 1.51 1.28  .42 .84  
6.04*** 
(120.50) 1.01 
Group Harmony         
 Community/ group support 1.04 1.22  .19 .60  
5.25*** 
(101.17) .88 
 Collaboration .85 1.25  .42 .75  2.49* (113.96) .42 
 Sense of belonging 1.35 1.31  .39 .78  5.33*** (113.70) .89 
 Harmonious relationship .59 1.04  .07 .31  
4.07*** 
(81.97) .68 
 Sharing .97 1.22  .18 .57  4.97*** (98.45) .83 
 Friendship and affection 1.83 1.23  .89 .96  
5.11*** 
(132.13) .85 





Japanese and American teachers’ reasons for selecting the best story 
 
Categories of Reasons Frequency  





1. Good/important value, message, lesson, moral, role model 8 10 .33 
2. Good description of situations 7 0 8.04** 
3. Good description of feelings 8 0 9.39** 
4. Good language (e.g., beautiful, clear) 5 1 3.00 
5. Good vocabulary 1 7 5.28* 
6. Good for improving reading comprehension skill 0 5 5.51* 
7. Appropriate length 4 0 4.32* 
8. Appropriate difficulty 7 9 .36 
9. Provokes children’s interest, engaging, attractive  characters 10 10 .00 
10. Children can relate to the protagonist or situations 6 7 .10 
11. Unconventional/unexpected plot 4 2 .75 
12. Leads to good discussion 0 8 9.39** 
13. Heart-warming/happy atmosphere of the story 4 0 4.32* 
14. Funny/exciting plot 10 3 4.96* 
15. Good pictures 1 2 .35 
16. Promotes creative writing 0 5 5.51* 
17. Good story structure/development 3 7 1.96 




Frequencies of independent and interdependent features in the stories created by Japanese 
and Americans  
 
Topic of Stories Japan US  
 Distinct Features of Stories Frequency Frequency  x2 (df=1) 
Bus Trip Stories N=20 N=16  
Independence    
 Trying to make oneself feel better 3 3 .09 
 Telling others about feeling sick 4 4 .13 
 Having fun 13 8 .82 
 Analyzing the causality of sickness 1 5 4.41* 
Interdependence    
 Being recognized his/her sickness by others 12 1 11.13*** 
 Being worried or helped by others 16 3 13.38*** 
 Tolerating sickness 16 7 5.06* 
 Concern for others (not to spoil others’ fun, not to give trouble to others, avoid being disliked)  9 1 6.65** 
 Pretending to be ok, hide sickness from others 9 1 6.65** 
 Feeling lonely, isolated, envy others 6 3 .60 
 Appreciation for others 11 0 12.68*** 
 Feeling guilty 2 2 .06 
Neutral    
 Throwing up 2 6 3.89* 
 Feeling better 15 6 5.14* 
Piano Stories N=19 N=18  
Independence    
 Nominating self to be accompanist 10 17 8.19** 
 Rivalry/competition for getting the accompanist position 3 3 .01 
 Practicing alone 7 8 .22 
 Worrying about not playing well 4 8 2.31 
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 Eager to show off his/her talent to others 0 5 6.10* 
 Individual success as a pianist 6 12 4.56* 
 Having confidence to succeed 3 7 2.50 
Interdependence    
 Group practice 6 1 4.08* 
 Hesitating to raise hand, see others before nominating oneself 14 1 17.80*** 
 Being nominated by peer(s) 8 1 6.71** 
 Peers' approval for becoming accompanist/ support/encouragement/comfort 13 2 12.59*** 
 Teacher's approval for becoming accompanist/ support/encouragement/comfort 4 4 .01 
 Appreciated by others 5 1 2.93+ 
 Feeling of togetherness, shared pleasure 7 0 8.18** 
 Class Success 6 6 .01 
Neutral    
 Negative feeling towards others/frustration 4 0 4.25* 
 Negative feeling from others 3 2 .17 
 Quit the position, not coming to school 2 1 .31 
Softball Story N=19 N=16  
Independence    
 Excited with getting the chance to play 1 4 2.76+ 
 Successful play by the protagonist 8 6 .08 
 Gaining confidence after playing well 3 1 .78 
 Negative feeling or behavior for unfair treatment 3 4 .46 
 Appealing to be in the game, try show he/her is a good player 2 4 1.28 
Interdependence    
 Lending a glove with one’s own will 9 1 7.20** 
 Friendship/team spirit/feeling of togetherness 7 1 4.61* 
 Thinking about group benefit 7 1 4.61* 
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 Hesitate about taking advantage of others or situation 4 0 3.80
+ 
 Worrying about failure/not playing well (and as a the team would lose) 7 1 4.61* 
 Receiving encouragement/support/comfort from others 5 2 1.04 
 Given chance to play in the game by others 8 7 .01 
Neutral    
 Failure or bad play by the protagonist 6 2 1.80 
 Increased motivation, practice harder 11 1 10.28*** 
 Decreased motivation, quit softball, leave game 0 4 5.36* 
 Bing praised by others 4 5 .47 
 Being told to lend a glove 5 7 1.17 
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 Growing up in a given cultural context, people learn and internalize culturally 
shared meanings – the process called enculturation. To successfully “enculturated” 
individuals, these meanings are ordinary and often unrecognizable. Not surprisingly, 
people can often recognize characteristics of foreign cultures but not their own. Yet these 
deeply internalized meaning systems regulate individuals’ perceptions, thought processes, 
motivations, emotions, and behaviors (e.g., Bruner, 1990; Fiske, Kitayama, Markus, & 
Nisbett, 1998; Kitayama, Duffy, Uchida, 2007; Markus & Kitayama, 1991). The three 
chapters presented in this dissertation aimed to address the culturally sanctioned 
meanings that are ubiquitously available in the cultural environment, deeply insinuated 
into individuals’ psychological systems, and consequential for individuals’ cognitive and 
affective reactions in various situations. 
 Chapter 2 specifically focused on cognitive dissonance, which was once 
assumed to be a universal psychological phenomenon. However, the present research 
hypothesized that cognitive dissonance would take culturally divergent forms – personal 
or interpersonal. The personal form of dissonance occurs among Americans when a 
choice is made in private, and the interpersonal from of dissonance occurs among Asians 
when a choice is made in public. In support of the hypothesis, the studies found that 
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Asian Americans and Japanese justified their choice more when they made a choice in 
front of a poster that unobtrusively induced an impression of public scrutiny, whereas 
European (and African) Americans justified their choice more when they made a choice 
without the poster. 
 While both types of dissonance occur when the self is threatened by the choice, 
they take culturally divergent forms because, according to our analysis, the nature of the 
self that is threatened differs across cultures. That is, an independent self is threatened by 
a personal choice because such a choice reflects one’s internal attributes. In contrast, an 
interpersonal self is threatened by a public choice because it should reflect the person’s 
good standing in his or her harmonious relationships.  
 Culturally different implications of the presence of others also play an important 
role in these dissonance processes. The presence of “eyes of others” probably made Asian 
Americans and Japanese aware of the social standards and expectations they should meet, 
thus, motivated them to justify their choice, whereas the same stimuli made Americans 
perceive their choice to be influenced, thus not as a true reflection of the self. Indeed, 
Experiment 3 found that European Americans ceased to justify their choice when it was 
made in front of influential “eyes of others.” Although participants were totally unaware 
of such cognitive processes, a mere face-like stimulus was enough to automatically 
activate their cultural schemas and induce (or eliminate) the dissonance processes. In this 
respect, the unconscious is quite smart and functional (Bargh & Morsella, in press) as it 
can process individuals’ perception and cognition particularly in a cultural adoptive way. 
 In Chapter 3, the research turned its focus onto emotional consequences of the 
culturally divergent forms of cognitive appraisal. Although past research has accumulated 
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plenty of evidence for the pervasive self-serving biases among Americans and their 
absence or even opposite tendencies among Asians (Heine, Lehman, Markus, & 
Kitayama, 1999 for a review), the present research is, to my knowledge, the first to apply 
the cognitive appraisal theories in cross-cultural contexts and to investigate cultural 
differences in emotion that result from culturally different appraisal of the situation.  
 In support of our hypothesis that people in different cultures experience different 
types of emotion as a result of different agency appraisal, the present studies found that 
Americans reported stronger self-agency emotions (e.g., proud) in success situations and 
other- or situation- agency emotions (e.g., angry, unlucky) in failure situations. In 
contrast, Japanese reported stronger situation-agency emotion (lucky) in success 
situations and self-agency emotions (e.g., ashamed) in failure situations. To further 
support the hypothesis, the cultural difference in emotion became non-significant or was 
significantly reduced once Americans and Japanese were induced to make the same 
agency appraisal.  
 What produces such culturally divergent appraisal and emotion tendencies is 
another question, and the studies suggest that culturally prevalent concepts of the self and 
others again play important roles. That is, individuals (mostly Americans) who view 
themselves as better than others, tend to take a credit for successes but blame others for 
failures whereas individuals (mostly Japanese) who view themselves as no better than or 
even inferior to others tend to attribute successes to others but blame themselves for 
failures.  
 It is important to note that individuals in both cultures may actualize the ideal 
cultural self by engaging in such attributions and experiencing the corresponding 
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emotions. It is quite obvious that Americans can enhance the positive internal attributes 
through self-serving attribution and emotion. However, it may be difficult to understand 
how Japanese can enhance their interdependent self through self-criticizing attribution 
and emotion. It is suggested that, by recognizing their inadequacy, Japanese can strive to 
meet social standards and expectations, and such effort may be considered to be a social 
commitment and indication of the ideal interdependent self (Heine, Lehman, Markus, & 
Kitayama, 1999). 
 While Chapters 2 and 3 focused on cognitive and emotional reactions in 
particular situations, Chapter 4 more broadly examined culturally sanctioned values. 
Study 1 demonstrated that American children’s stories highlighted themes of 
independence such as self-direction and achievement. In contrast, their Japanese 
counterparts highlighted themes of interdependence such as conformity and group 
harmony. Study 2 showed that Japanese elementary school teachers were more likely to 
adopt stories with interdependent themes than those with independent themes as their 
teaching materials although no such differential preference was evident among American 
teachers. Furthermore, Study 3 found analogous cultural differences in the themes of 
stories freely composed by American and Japanese college students. For example, the 
stories created by Americans were mostly about personal achievement, and others were 
minimally involved in their stories. In a stark contrast, the stories created Japanese 
emphasized friendship, sympathy, and sense of belonging, and others played very 
important roles in their stories.  
 Over all, these findings imply that cultural environment is abundant in materials 
with culturally sanctioned meanings, and those meanings are deeply internalized by 
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individuals who reproduce culture. It is therefore concluded that children’s stories are 
both a product and a producer of culturally divergent forms of the self. 
 While each chapter mentioned its specific limitations and future directions, it is 
also important to mention some general challenges and directions for future research in 
this chapter. One of the challenges that are shared by many cultural psychologists is that 
it is extremely difficult to scientifically demonstrate that cultural environment is indeed 
shaping people’s mind. Practically, it is impossible to randomly assign our participants to 
grow up in either one culture or the other. Yet, some cultural psychologists cleverly came 
up with the ways to make such a causal inference. For example, we can follow 
individuals who move from one cultural contexts to another and observe any changes in 
their psychological tendencies (Heine & Lehman, 2004).  
 Yet another, more commonly used technique is the use of cultural priming. That 
is, participants are exposed to stimuli that activate different cultural schemes such as 
different pronouns (i.e., “I” or “me” vs. “we” or “us”; Brewer & Gardner, 1996; Gardner, 
Gabriel, & Lee, 1999), cultural icons (e.g., the Statue of Liberty vs. Chinese dragon; 
Hong, Morris, Chiu, & Benet-Martínez, 2000), or pictures of city scenes in different 
cultures (Miyamoto, Nisbett, & Masuda, 2006). Although this raises another question that 
how malleable culturally adopted cognitive styles are, past studies with priming methods 
reported significant changes in participants’ cognitive styles. Thus, similar methods can 
temporarily induce certain psychological tendencies among individuals, such as personal 
dissonance vs. interpersonal dissonance. Also, children’s stories with different value 
emphasis can be used to prime individuals’ cultural orientation, which may result in 
temporal changes in their psychological tendencies as well. 
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 Another future direction that I would like to pursue is to investigate how children, 
during their developmental processes, come to learn and internalize cultural meaning 
systems. Obviously, children cannot learn from textbook stories before they learn their 
language. Also, peer influence may become a more important source after they enroll in 
preschools or elementary schools while parent-child interaction starts from the day a baby 
is born. Thus, to better understand the emergence of culturally specific cognitive 
tendencies, it is important to investigate their relation to age-specific cultural 
environments, such as cultural products or daily activities for a particular age group. Also, 
it is important to consider other developmental processes that co-occur, such as language 
acquisition, emergence of self-concept, theory of mind, executive function, and 
neuropsychologcal development. Moreover, finding out some universal, innate 
psychological patterns among a young age group and their ramifications for culturally 
specific tendencies in older age group may also be another way to make inferences about 
the effect of cultural environment on people’s psychological tendencies. 
 While priming methods and examination of developmental processes are 
important in finding out how culturally specific psychological tendencies are acquired on 
an individual level, they would not answer the very important question – how 
independence became so pervasive in North America and how interdependence became 
so pervasive in East Asia?  
 This investigation involves exploration of the historical origins, and, as briefly 
mentioned in Chapter 4, the evidence is still limited but gradually accumulating. For 
example, a herding culture is found to be high in independence in comparison to farming 
and fishing cultures (Uskul, Kitayama, & Nisbett, in press). Societies of high social 
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mobility (i.e., frequent moving) are found to be more independent than those of low 
social mobility (Oishi, Lun, & Sherman, 2008). Also, societies with high pathogen 
prevalence in their histories are more interdependent than those with low pathogen 
prevalence (Fincher, Thornhill, Murray, and Schaller, 2008). Moreover, societies that 
went through the history of voluntary settlement, such as the United States and Hokkaido 
in Japan, are high in independence in comparison to societies without such history, such 
as Germany and Mainland Japan (Kitayama, Ishii, Imada, Takemura, & Ramaswamy, 
2006; Kitayama, Park, Sevincer, Karasawa, & Uskul, 2008).  
 Viewing culture as an evolving social system, cultures must have adopted what 
has been functional at a given time of their long histories. Independent psychological 
mind must have provided survival advantages in some societies whereas interdependent 
psychological mind must have served better in other societies. Investigating such 
psychological advantages in historical, geographical, and eco-biological contexts would 
break through the reciprocal loop of culture and mind and greatly expand the empirical 
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